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SELECTIVE SERVICE

A STUDY OF ITS ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

A Thesis

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Master of Science in Public Administration

By

CLAYTON WEBER ERNST, A.B.

The Ohio State University

1951

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SELECTIVE SERVICE

A STUDY OF ITS ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

CLAYTON WEBER BERNT
A.B., Western Reserve University, 1940

Department of Political Science

(Approved by Harvey Walker)

This study attempts to determine whether a selective service system can be designed to bring military force to bear in time of necessity sufficient to prevent defeat and to insure final victory without unduly endangering the continued existence of the United States as a democratic State. If such a selective service system cannot be designed, some other system will be required.

From American experience it appears obvious that the militia, professional, and volunteer systems, individually and collectively, cannot meet the requirements of American security. Thus it follows that the United States must rely on some form of conscription to meet the needs of National security. But a review of the accomplishments of selective service shows a progressive deterioration until its present adequacy is open to serious question.

Much of the foreign experience with selective service systems tends to reinforce the conclusions drawn from American experience. Of all foreign nations which have relied on selective service, only Great Britain is in a situation similar to that of the United States, and Great Britain now has

found selective service to be inadequate and has adopted a system of peacetime conscription.

In the light of evidence that selective service will probably not be adequate to meet the future military needs of the United States, the following five point plan is proposed:

1. Professional Armed Services made up of career personnel performing normal peacetime, training, and planning functions.
2. Universal Military Training of all males shortly after the normal age for graduation from high school.
3. Universal Military Reserve Service for all males upon completion of their training period.
4. Modification of the present reserve program so that it serves the purpose of implementing point three.
5. Selective non-combatant service in wartime for both women and older men, as necessitated by manpower requirements.

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

One of the crucial problems facing the United States today is whether selective service, as a method of building and maintaining armed forces, is the proper way to meet the requirements of National security. These requirements, which are predicated on the idea that our armed forces exist for defense rather than offense, must take account of the rapidly increasing tempo of modern warfare, the new techniques of warfare, particularly atomic weapons, and the necessity for maintaining democratic principles and avoiding unnecessary expenditures of men and material. It is the purpose of this thesis to test the adequacy of selective service to meet, against the background of these requirements, the defense needs of the American democracy in today's world.

Types of Armed Forces

Before turning to an analysis of selective service it is important to define and distinguish the various types of armed forces which are, or could be, available to a country. The oldest of these is the militia. The obligation of every able-bodied man to contribute to the defense of his community extends back beyond the dawn of history. In America due to the geographical separation of the colonies and emphasis on local rule, the militia developed as a force primarily responsible to the State governments. For the purpose of this thesis the militia will be defined as a military or naval force organized and controlled on a local basis. The present

THE PROBLEM

One of the important problems facing the United States today is education. Education is a method of training and developing the individual to live effectively in his environment. Human relationships, which are involved in the life of every individual, are a necessary part of his environment. If he is going to live effectively in society, he must understand and adjust to these relationships. Education is the process of helping the individual to learn how to live effectively in society.

Purpose of Study

Before discussing the importance of education, it is necessary to define and differentiate the various types of human learning which are involved in the activities of a normal life. The simplest form of learning is the acquisition of skills. The ability to type, to write shorthand, to operate a machine, to play golf, or to swim are examples of skills. The acquisition of skills is the development of a human performance which is necessary for the successful adjustment to the environment and satisfaction in "normal living." The second type of learning is the acquisition of information. Information is necessary for the development of skills, but it is also necessary for the development of attitudes, ideals, and appreciations. Attitudes are the tendencies to react favorably or unfavorably toward persons, objects, or ideas. Ideals are the standards of behavior which are considered worthy of attainment. Appreciations are the enjoyments which are derived from certain experiences. Appreciations are the result of the satisfaction of needs, desires, and interests. Appreciations are the result of the satisfaction of needs, desires, and interests. Appreciations are the result of the satisfaction of needs, desires, and interests.

National Guard has been moving away from this concept of a militia in the direction of a National volunteer reserve.

There are many similarities between professional and volunteer armed forces and also a few basic differences. For the purposes of this thesis they will both be considered as national organizations only. They are both made up of persons who are in the armed forces as a matter of choice. However, there is a basic difference in motive behind the professional and the volunteer. The professional enters the armed forces as a career; he has weighed the risks and inconveniences against the benefits and has made a deliberate choice based on self-interest. The volunteer enters the armed forces in order to serve his country and with the intent to go back to civilian life as soon as his services are no longer required. In practice the volunteer force is often a reserve force. So, for the purpose of this thesis, the professional armed force and the volunteer armed force are both defined as being organized on a national basis and composed of persons who enter into service as a matter of choice. They are differentiated by the motive inducing the persons composing them to enter—in general, the professional enters to serve his own interests, and the volunteer enters to serve the interests of society.

The third major group of persons serving in armed forces are the conscripts, i.e. those who are forced to serve, and it is under this general heading that selective service falls. The conscript armed force may be defined as being organized on a national basis and composed of persons serving as required by law. There are four types of conscription. Selective service may be defined as a means of raising a conscript force organized only in sufficient number to

meet an impending or already existing need which may vary from the requirements of active hostilities to a mere failure to obtain an adequate number of professionals to meet peacetime needs. The second type, selective training, is the giving of military training to a group selected without their own consent. Since it is difficult to conceive of selective training existing as an end in itself, it will be considered as being included in the term "selective service." The remaining two types of conscription, universal military service and universal military training, are differentiated from selective service in that they encompass practically all able-bodied men and not just a specific number needed for a specific purpose. It is hard to imagine military training existing without at least a minimal amount of co-existent military service. It is harder still to imagine military service without prior military training. Thus the difference between universal military training and universal military service is one of emphasis. Normally, it may be anticipated that universal military training will take a shorter portion of the life of the conscript than universal military service. Both universal military training and universal military service may be on a reserve basis. Thus the types of conscript armed forces are differentiated by universality as to both time and persons and by relative emphasis on service and training.

It may be profitable to examine the various units of the present military establishment of the United States in the light of these definitions. The Army has long been concerned with all of these types of armed forces either in theory or in practice. The Navy, and more recently the Air Force, are latecomers to the problem, with primary reliance on professionals and volunteers augmented by those individuals

who elected to choose the branch of the armed forces in which they would serve when their eventual conscription became inevitable. However, in both World Wars it became necessary to bring all services under conscription in order to avoid chaos. It goes without saying that professional or regular forces provide the first line of defense. Today both the Army and the Air Force rely on semi-militia organizations, the National Guard and Air National Guard, to provide the second line of defense. All three services, and especially the Navy, rely on volunteer reserves under direct Federal control. And all three services rely upon conscription in the form of selective service to provide the manpower necessary for victory in time of war and the additional manpower needed to maintain the authorized complement in time of peace. Thus the American military establishment is a combination of all the major types of armed forces defined above.

One type fuses and blends into another until the distinctions tend to become more and more hazy to all except the planners concerned with raising, training, and utilizing the armed services. The conscript may become a militiaman, a reserve volunteer, or a professional after completing his term of enforced service. The volunteer may elect to make a career of the service. After seeing Paris the National Guardsman may not want to return to the farm. It must be borne in mind that the conscript who accepts a career in the armed forces is no less the product of conscription after becoming a professional than before. Had there been no conscripts or volunteers, there would be fewer professionals today.

Democracy

Since national security involves the defense of our form of

government, as well as our territory, one of the requirements of that security is that it not destroy democracy. What, then is democracy? One of the oldest existing definitions of democracy is still pertinent today.

> ...democracy, which is a charming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike.[1]

The concept of the equality of all men before the law is basic to a democracy, and parallel to this is the equality of all men in the right to election to public office provided that they meet the constitutional and statutory qualifications. In a democracy the government exists for the benefit of the citizens and not the citizens for the benefit of the government. The government derives its powers from the consent of the governed in such a way as to insure respect for personal liberties and to make revolution unnecessary as a means of expressing the popular will. The subservience of the military to civilian control has been traditionally viewed as basic to a democracy; military domination would be a major step in the direction of an authoritarian form of government. A means of providing for the National security which would involve an unnecessary risk of the violation of any of these basic component concepts of democracy would be patently unacceptable.

Military Requirements

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to develop a complete analysis of the military requirements of National security; however, in order properly to evaluate selective service the broad

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[1]Plato, Apology - Crito - Phaedo - Symposium - Republic, trans. by B. Jowett (New York: Walter J. Black, /1942/), p. 447.

outlines of these requirements must be understood. Perhaps the best way to determine the military requirements of National security is to review the cycle of war and peace. The first and shortest stage in the cycle is the initial onslaught of the enemy. Following this is the build-up period and then the offensive period culminating in victory. After victory, comes the occupation period which should be a transition to peace. The requirements of National security are those things necessary to insure that defeat does not interrupt this cycle.

In times of peace the military establishment is needed to prepare and train for possible future wars, to perform both internal and external police duties, as the foreign and domestic policies of the Nation require, and to give strength to the arms of diplomacy. At the time of the initial onslaught of the enemy the military establishment must be strong enough to slow down the advance of the enemy. The enemy must be held more or less stationary during the build-up or defense period; pressure on the enemy should increase during this period until the defensive stage passes almost insensibly into the offensive stage. Ideally the offensive tempo should be constantly increasing until it culminates in the absolute defeat of the enemy. The period of occupation of the enemy land is a transition period during which the military establishment gradually reverts to peacetime size and composition.

The requirements of National security are defensive requirements and perhaps requirements for preventing war, but never requirements for waging aggressive war. It is an unfortunate fact though that a military establishment which is sufficient to defend the United

States from attack by another major power is disquietingly large in the eyes of lesser powers. This places a burden upon the United States to observe scrupulously the rights of its own citizens and of smaller nations so that this Nation may have friends in the family of nations. A military establishment which aroused the fears and enmity of smaller nations would increase the burden of National security by simultaneously increasing the probability of war and the number of enemies.

The military requirements of National security may be broadly summarized as the providing of a military establishment sufficient to avoid defeat and to win eventual victory. From such a definition it is possible to determine the required order of magnitude of the military establishment by a review of the size of the military establishments of potential enemies. Each method or combination of methods may then be tested for its ability to provide the required military establishment.

Criteria for Judging Selective Service

Two criteria for judging selective service have already been suggested. The National security test is by far the most important; no matter how well selective service meets the other standards, it will be useless if it does not protect National security. That cannot be said about any other criterion; it might even be necessary to take a calculated risk on the political side if that was the only way National security could be protected. However, the political criterion which was discussed in part under the heading "Democracy" is second only to that of National security.

The economic standard is inextricably interwoven with that of

National security. If selective service meets all the other criteria but costs too much in either men or material, it could seriously impair the ability of the Nation to provide for future security. The legal aspect is not considered in this thesis for two reasons. First, the author is not competent to judge questions of constitutional law, and second, the legal impediments to any system of conscription can be removed if the political test is satisfied. The remaining criteria, i.e. biological, physiological, psychological, and sociological, do not permit an objective evaluation. For example, the opinion is widely held that universal military training destroys the moral fibre of a nation; however, some historians trace the decline of the Roman Republic to the moral disintegration following the release of Roman citizens from their obligation for military service. Criteria other than National security and politics will generally be disregarded in this thesis, and even the political aspect will be a poor second to the National security criterion.

Summary

This study will attempt to determine whether a selective service system can be designed to bring military force to bear in time of necessity sufficient to prevent defeat and to insure final victory without unduly endangering the continued existence of the United States as a democratic state. If such a selective service system cannot be designed, some other system will be required.

CHAPTER II

THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCRIPTION IN AMERICAN ARMED FORCES

American concepts of and prejudices on the subject of military training had their remote beginnings in the practices of the Teutonic tribes. The Franks, Lombards, and Visigoths along with the Angles and Saxons who invaded and settled in England imposed a personal obligation for military service on all able-bodied males from the age of sixteen to sixty. This duty was deemed a privilege in that only free men had the right to serve in this body of militia, known as the "fryd." The Norman Kings of England retained this pre-feudal militia to offset the power of their feudal nobles; the obligation of each free man not only to serve in the "fryd" but also to furnish his own arms, equipment, and provisions was formalized by law and decree. However, in 1352, Parliament deprived the king of power to oblige a member of the "fryd" to serve beyond the realm without the consent of Parliament. After the War of the Roses, this militia was the only army England had left, and a motley, ill-trained, undisciplined fighting force it was.

To James I the "fryd" appeared as a threat to the security of his throne; so in the first year of his reign he excused its members from providing their own weapons but took no effective steps to provide them with weapons from government funds. In the Civil War of 1642 to 1648 the militia was both hopelessly divided and no match for the standing army created by Cromwell which he significantly called

"The New Model." In token of the popular dislike for Cromwell's army, one of the first acts after the Restoration was to reestablish the militia and to reduce the standing army to a royal bodyguard of six thousand men. The attempt of James II to increase his bodyguard to fifteen thousand men and to restore autocratic rule resulted in his expulsion and in firmly implanting in the English mind the strong distrust for standing armies which had been born during the Commonwealth period.

The Revolutionary War

The first settlers in America brought with them the English militia system, and the grim necessities of pioneer life increased its importance. By the time of the American Revolution every colony required military training and/or service from its citizens. On July 18, 1775, a year prior to the Declaration of Independence, the Continental Congress recommended to the colonies that all able-bodied men between the ages of sixteen and fifty be organized into companies of militia. Prior to this recommendation Massachusetts had selected one quarter of its militia to be organized as "minute men."

Conceding that the militia could only be called out with the consent of the colonial legislatures, the Continental Congress authorized the raising of a "Continental Army" through voluntary enlistments induced by ever-larger offers of cash bounties. The militia of each colony was to be used only for the purpose of relieving continental troops or of opposing sudden enemy attacks in that colony or a neighboring colony and then only with the consent of the colony. The volunteer system failed utterly. The largest American force in any single battle was the seventeen thousand militiamen laying siege to

Boston when George Washington took command of the army at Cambridge. In March, 1777 Washington reported that he had but one thousand regular troops and two thousand militia whose enlistment expired that month to oppose twenty thousand British in the New York area. In the seven years the war dragged on, the British had a maximum strength of forty-two thousand in 1781 while there was a total of three hundred ninety-five thousand different men in the American armies at one time or another. Without the aid of French troops and the French navy the final victory at Yorktown would not have been possible.

In reply to a letter from Alexander Hamilton, Washington wrote:

> It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system, that every Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense of it, and consequently that the Citizens of America (with a few legal and official exception) from 18 to 50 Years of Age should be borne on the Militia Rolls, provided with uniform Arms, and so far accustomed to the use of them, that the Total strength of the County might be called forth at Short Notice.../and/ duly organized into Commands... They ought to be regularly Mustered and trained, and to have their Arms and Accoutrements inspected at certain appointed times.../and/ able bodied young Men, between the age of 18 and 25...drafted to form a Corps in every State... to be employed whenever it may become necessary in the service of their Country....[1]

The lessons that should have been learned from experience during the Revolutionary War were well summarized by the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee in 1939 as follows:

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[1]George Washington, The Writing of George Washington, ed. by John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), XXVI, pp. 389-90, as quoted by The President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training in A Program for National Security (Washington: 1947), p. 362.

(1) The only effective troops were those enlisted for the duration of the war.
(2) The method of voluntary enlistment was not able to supply adequate men.
(3) State troops were not satisfactory instruments for the National Government.
(4) The militia system was wasteful of money and completely ineffective as a means of conducting war.[2]

From the Revolutionary War to the Civil War

In the years immediately following the end of the Revolutionary War a series of plans were proposed to change the rabble-like militia of that war into an effective citizen army or "well-regulated militia" as it was termed in those days. From the well conceived plans of Generals Steuben and Knox there eventually came forth the ineffective Militia Act of 1792.[3] This act required that all free, able-bodied, white male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-four inclusive be enrolled in a militia company in his locality and placed upon each of them the duty of appearing properly armed, accoutered, and provided for training or service when called. No penalty was provided for failure to comply with the law. This act was not deemed satisfactory by Presidents Washington, Jefferson, and Madison; they strongly advocated a more effective law, but English traditions and popular trust in the farmers with rifles to whom politicians and populace alike gave full credit for the victory in the Revolutionary War were prejudices too great to be overcome in that generation. "It would have been difficult for Congress to have disregarded more completely the mature advice of our Revolutionary leaders and early

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[2] American Selective Service (Washington: 1939), p. 6.

[3] 1 U. S. Stat. at L. (1792), 272.

Presidents."[4] Contemporaneously, France adopted the first modern, democratic conscription act, in 1793, to be followed by universal military service five years later.

At the outbreak of the War of 1812, the United States Army had an authorized strength of thirty-five thousand, but an actual strength of only sixty-seven hundred. Very few persons were particularly worried when non-response to calls for volunteers forced reliance upon the militia. After all there were only forty-five hundred British troops in North America. Then after two years of ineffectual warfare came the action at Bladensburg. With the British threatening Washington forty-four hundred militiamen dutifully responded to the call to service and then fled when the first shot was fired, leaving Washington open to pillage and destruction. On at least three occasions during the war the militia stood on its constitutional rights and refused to cross the National boundary, once abandoning to capture or annihilation an American force under attack at Queenston, Canada. In the year 1813 there were two hundred thirty-five thousand men called out at one time or another, but the greatest number of effectives on any one field of battle was less than three thousand. Believing it obvious that the war could not be fought with non-existent volunteers and militiamen, limited in service both geographically and as to time and responsible to State rather than National authority, the Secretary of War proposed a conscription act in 1814. But, with appropriate references to the heroes of the Revolution, Congress, under the leadership of Daniel Webster, declined to enact the proposed conscrip-

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[4]Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee, American Selective Service (Washington: 1939), p. 7.

[illegible] Jung, Carl Gustav. Psychische Energetik [illegible]. Zurich: Rascher Verlag, 1928), p. 7.

tion law because of doubts as to its constitutionality.

In the years following the War of 1812 the militia grew less rather than more effective; militia training in most places degenerated into one annual "muster day" which usually became the excuse for a grand bacchanal. In the War with Mexico, reliance was placed on Regular troops and twelve-month volunteers. United States troops were outnumbered by the Mexican troops, but due to better leadership and training they won a relatively easy victory. However, the victory would have come sooner and more easily if General Scott had not had to send home over forty percent of his men because their twelve-month enlistment had expired. While Scott waited for weeks halfway to Mexico City until reinforcements reached him, Santa Anna was able to reassemble the Mexican Army that had earlier been shattered as an effective force by Scott.

In the period just prior to the Civil War the native American antipathy toward large standing armies and conscription was reinforced by the arrival of liberal refugees from Europe to whom the successes of Napoleon with a conscript army and the use of large standing armies to suppress the liberal revolutions of 1848 were vivid memories. Americans, in general, had failed to learn the lessons that an untrained militia results only in wasted lives, that forces not under federal authority are not effective, that reliance on volunteers is doomed to failure, that the use of short-term enlistments to encourage volunteering defeats the basic purpose of volunteering, and above all that the concept of the citizen owing his obligation for military service to the State rather than the National Government was untenable now that the country had been knit into one closely integrated national

community.

The Civil War: The North

In the period of 1861-62 in the North the early calls for volunteers on a short time basis received prompt and enthusiastic response. President Lincoln's first call for seventy-five thousand volunteers from among the half-organized militia was quickly filled; however, the term of Federal service for these militiamen was limited to three months by existing laws. The first militia to report for Federal service were units of the District of Columbia militia which were limited to service within the boundaries of the district. As each succeeding call for volunteers extended the term of service, the alacrity with which each call was filled decreased.

Finally the volunteer system collapsed when there was practically no response to the July 2, 1862 call for three hundred thousand volunteers. The individual States were then given a quota, to be met by militia or volunteers by August 4, 1862, with the proviso that if these quotas were not so met the States were to supply the deficiency through conscription by September 5, 1862. When the quotas were not forthcoming from militia and volunteers, the States attempted to conscript men but failed, primarily due to the absence of federal assistance.[5] This failure of the militia system, volunteering, and State conscription to provide the necessary numbers of men occurred at the time when the Confederate forces were giving Union troops military reverses of a most serious nature.

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[5]Enoch H. Crowder, The Spirit of Selective Service (New York: The Century Co., 1920), p. 30.

[illegible]

The Right Time for Liberty

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

13 Finally on March 3, 1863 an Enrollment Act[6] was passed which changed the individual's liability for military service from the State to the Nation. Despite its historic importance as the nation's first national conscription statute, this act stands as a monumental example of how not to conscript men; it provided for the conscription of men in those Congressional Districts where the assigned quota was not met through volunteering, for the purchase of exemptions for three hundred dollars, and for the providing of substitutes. In effect this meant that wealthy districts could meet their quotas by purchasing substitutes from poorer districts which then still had to fill their quotas from depleted reservoirs of manpower.

14 The individual had five choices when his turn came to be drafted:

1) He could enlist in the district of his choice; i.e. the one that would pay him the greatest bounty.

2) He could procure a substitute; the newspapers would give him the latest quotations of the substitute market.

3) He could purchase a commutation of his conscription for three hundred dollars to be used by the government in procuring a substitute.

4) He could claim a legal exemption by virtue of being married, being an alien, or being in an exempted occupation.

5) Or he could let himself be conscripted.

Only 46,347 men accepted the fifth choice; the odium attached to being a conscript was too much to bear.

15 To make a bad matter worse, conscription was made a purely

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[6] 12 U. S. Stat. at L. (1863), 731.

[1] 11 C. B. Lond. 91 (1910), 102.

federal matter under the direction of the Provost Marshal General who also had responsibility for detecting spies and apprehending deserters. Men were enrolled by a census-type procedure with military officers going from house to house. The direct result of this was ninety-eight registrars either killed or wounded and an extremely antagonistic public attitude toward conscription,--so antagonistic, in fact, that the first attempts to conscript men resulted in what are probably among the worst riots that this country has ever seen. The reaction to conscription is succinctly summed up in the following quotation:

> A section of the press fumed with indignation. Mobs yelled, demonstrated, and in their illogical fury lynched negroes, seeing in these unfortunates the cause of all their troubles. But the mobs were not the American people. They were only a noisy and contemptible minority of the American people, whose importance as well as courage had been vastly overrated. The quiet people were in deadly earnest, and they supported their President.[7]

The Civil War: The South

The Confederate forces were composed of State militia, volunteers who had the unusual privilege of electing their own company officers, and a professional army, which was never raised except for officers. The early rush of volunteers and militia often exceeded the calls for them. But by the Fall of 1861 there was a rapid falling off in enthusiasm, and even with the Confederate Congress passing an act a month to promote recruiting the situation became critical by the Spring of 1862. On April 16, 1862 a Conscription Act[8] was

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[7] Frederick Scott Oliver, Ordeal by Battle (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd, 1915), p. 418.

[8] 1 C.S.A. Stat. at L. (1862), 29.

passed even though it was a contradiction of the very essence of the State's Rights principles of the Confederacy. The immediate effect of the act was to retrieve the mistake of short enlistments in time to retain 148 regiments of twelve-month men who were shortly due for discharge. The act provided that conscripts were to be placed in organizations of their home state; amendments later restricted the drafting of men to the state in which domiciled, i.e. residing with the intent to remain permanently.

The President was authorized to use State officials for the enrollment of conscripts under procedures established by the Secretary of War provided that the Governor concerned consented to their use. Failing this, he was authorized to use Confederate officers. The use of State officials proved to be a serious weakness in the act, as general friction grew between State and Confederate officials and as conflict grew between the needs of the Confederate forces and the needs of local defense.

Six days after the passage of the Conscription Act the Confederate Congress passed an Exemption Act[9]; both of these acts were amended in details several times but the basic principles underwent little modification. Exemptions were granted to persons in specified occupations, and men were detailed from the army to do special kinds of skilled labor. Substitution was permitted for the stated purpose of utilizing the potentialities of men in industrial lines; however, most men who

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[9] 1 C.S.A. Stat. at L. (1862), 51.

procured substitutes turned to profiteering. In response to growing popular resentment over these regulations, which benefited the rich more than the poor, exemptions were restricted in the latter days of the war and substitution was abolished in December, 1863. However, in most States, slackers still had refuge in the rapidly growing State Militia for local defense or in the equally rapidly growing minor officialdom. "As the Confederacy tottered to its fall the President and Congress were in sharp conflict over the revision of exemption, and there was serious friction between the Confederate and State authorities over the enforcement of it as it stood."[10] Due to lost territory, lost hope, and lost power of compulsion, conscription utterly failed during the last six months of the war. However, "a system of recruitment that enabled the Confederacy to maintain itself against tremendous odds for so long a time deserves a more sympathetic consideration than it has customarily had."[11]

The Civil War: Conclusions

It may be claimed with justice that neither the North nor the South had a conscription system; what they both had was a system of coerced volunteering. The systems used were designed to meet the needs of the military forces for "live bodies" with little regard for the overall needs of the National economy. Civil war experience accentuated the popular prejudices against conscription, which prejudices were later to be fortified by the wave of immigrants escaping

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[10] Albert Burton Moore, Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), pp. 105-6.

[11] Ibid., p. 355.

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service in the mass armies of Europe that grew out of the Prussianization of Germany and the defeat of France in 1870.

However, from a report summarizing the experiences with conscription and recommending a system for avoiding the conscription mistakes of the Civil War, the acts establishing the Selective Service Systems which served the Nation so well in the two World Wars drew their inspiration. Brigadier General James Oakes, Assistant Provost Marshal General for Illinois, recommended in an official report that (1) registration be by personal report of the enrollee to a registration office, (2) liability for service be lodged at the place of residence rather than the place of registration, (3) quotas be allotted by States with further subdivision the responsibility of the State headquarters, (4) substitutes and bounties be forbidden, and (5) the duration of the war be the uniform period of service.[12]

World War I: Pre-War Planning

In the years following the Civil War military preparedness declined until the Regular Army was little more than an aggregation of Indian-chasing units with an ineffective militia as the first line of reserves. The colleges receiving funds provided by land grants under the Morrill Act[13] (1862) taught military science and tactics

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[12]This report on draft experiences in Illinois was submitted shortly after the end of the Civil War to the War Department, where it gathered dust for many years. The original text of this report was not available to the author; however, it is referred to in many articles and books on conscription, for example see the comments of Edward A. Fitzpatrick in Conscription and America (Milwaukee, Wisc.: Richard Publishing Company, 1940), pp. 27-8. The five points listed above are those points believed pertinent to this study which were mentioned, directly or indirectly, in more than one secondary source.

[13] 12 U. S. Stat. at L. (1862), 503.

[illegible]

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without any great enthusiasm.[14]

In 1902, Secretary of War Elihu Root recommended the creation of a non-professional reserve of officers. Shortly thereafter the present Organized Reserves were born. The Militia Act of 1903[15] stated, in part, that the militia consisted of every able-bodied male between the ages of nineteen and forty-four inclusive and that it should be divided into (1) the organized militia, to be known as the National Guard, and (2) the Reserve Militia. The act provided for Federal support if certain minimum standards were met. In 1911, Major General Leonard Wood proposed reducing the period of enlistment so that a greater number of men could be trained. It was General Wood's contention that a first line of one hundred fifty thousand to two hundred thousand troops, militia and regular, would be adequate for the security of the Nation if there were also a body of trained ex-soldiers.[16]

The summer of 1913 saw the establishment of two experimental military camps of instruction for students of educational institutions. Emphasis was placed on disseminating sound information concerning American military history and policy. Two years later the first businessmen's camps were held under the sponsorship of a group including former President Theodore Roosevelt and General Wood. These two training camp organizations consolidated to form the Military Train-

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[14]Winthrop D. Lane, Military Training Schools and Colleges of the United States (New York: Committee on Military Training, 1928), p.8.

[15] 32 U. S. Stat. at L. (1903), 775.

[16]The comments in regard to General Wood are based on a study of the General's official reports as Chief of Staff, his published letters and speeches, and his biographies.

ing Camps Association of the United States in 1916.[17]

During the four months prior to American entry into World War I, the War College Division of the War Department presented two plans for systems of universal military training. To a large extent the administrative details of these plans followed those used in the Civil War. The concept included in these plans of short term universal military training to be followed by liability for service in the reserves was already under consideration by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs which held extensive hearings on a bill for universal military training introduced by Senator Chamberlain. As a result of these hearings Congress was in possession of a voluminous mass of information on the subject of conscription when the declaration of war came.[18]

World War I: Selective Draft Act of 1917[19]

Thirty-two days after the declaration of war a reluctant Congress, in response to the firm request of President Wilson, enacted a conscription law. This law required all male persons between the ages of twenty-one and thirty to register for the draft. With the exception of a small number of groups specifically exempted, all registrants were subject to induction into military service. These legally exempt groups were primarily alien enemies, licensed pilots, ministers of religion, theological and medical students, conscientious objectors,

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[17]The President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, A Program for National Security, (Washington: 1947), pp. 376-7.

[18]For example, see Universal Military Training, U.S. 65th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document 10 (1917).

[19] 40 U.S. Stat. at L. (1917), 76.

and government officers. The President was given wide latitude in exempting other groups of individuals as the best interests of the Nation might dictate. Bounties for enlistment, the purchase of exemptions, and substitutions were unequivocally banned by the law.

The Navy and the Marine Corps continued to obtain men through volunteer systems, and even the Army maintained its recruiting agencies. The continuation of recruiting by all branches of the armed forces in conjunction with the recruiting efforts of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, whose employees were draft exempt caused the near collapse of the Selective Service System in the Summer of 1918. Volunteering had disrupted the manpower balance between civilian and military needs which the Selective Service System was trying to maintain. So Congress, by the Act of August 31, 1918[20], discontinued all recruiting agencies of the armed forces and extended the age group liable for registration and possible service to include all males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five.

World War I: The Selective Service System

Even before the Selective Draft Act of 1917 was passed the Selective Service System was in operation. Alerting letters had been sent to all the State Governors; printing of registration forms had begun. The administration of the system was decentralized to State Headquarters which supervised the operation of local boards. The headquarters in Washington established policies, set quotas, and in general coordinated the efforts of the local boards through the State Headquarters. The registration organization originally named by State authorities was converted into a federal agency through the

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[20] 40 U. S. Stat. at L. (1918), 955.

[illegible]

device of appointment by the President after individual formal nomination by the State Governors. The concept of registrants voluntarily reporting to local boards composed of their neighbors did much to secure popular acceptance of the system.

Although it would have been possible to conduct the registration a week after passage of the Selective Draft Act, the registration was postponed until June 5 so that more complete explanation of the law might be disseminated. In this first registration nearly ten million men reported to four thousand boards employing over one hundred thousand volunteer workers. Two weeks later, on June 18, the selection regulations were published and the Selection Boards formally appointed. The National Lottery to determine the order of induction into the Army was held on July 20 with a great amount of attendant fanfare, and the first selectee was inducted into the Army on July 30--just two and one-half months after passage of the law. By September 1, there were one hundred eighty thousand selectees available for induction.

Quotas were apportioned to the States and subdivisions therein down to the county or city level on the basis of population, with credit allowed for enlisted members of the National Guard on April 1, 1917 and for enlistments in either the National Guard or Regular Army since that date. Those localities whose allowance for enlistments equalled or exceeded their quota were known as Banner Communities.

In the first six months of operation over one-half million men were placed in Army camps. The number inducted became limited only by the Army's ability to accept them. However, rapid inductions with little regard for industrial and agricultural requirements of manpower could not be long continued without serious damage to the

national interest. To correct this fault new regulations covering exemptions and deferments were published on November 15. Awesome questionnaires were distributed to all registrants, who sweated through them with the gratuitous aid of the legal profession.

Within the limits of national policy the local boards were given considerable latitude in the granting of exemptions. In addition to classes mentioned above[21] as being legally exempt, exemptions were granted to certain categories of resident aliens, to persons physically or mentally unfit for service, and to felons and traitors. In addition, deferments were granted to some categories of government officials and employees, to registrants employed in industrial or agricultural occupations necessary to the national interest, and to registrants with dependents. All registrants were placed in one of five classes dependent on the exemptions or deferments to which they were entitled. Class I was comprised of registrants immediately available to call for military duty. Registrants legally exempted from service were placed in Class V. All other registrants having some other type of exemption or deferment were placed in Classes II through IV depending upon the type and degree of deferment. When all registrants in Class I had been called, it was planned to call registrants in Class II and so forth.

Shortly after these new regulations on exemptions were placed in effect reverses on the Western Front placed new and greater demands upon the Selective Service System. During this period of large volume inductions, strong feelings developed against men who by virtue of

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[21]Supra, p. 22.

high draft order numbers or dependency deferments were free to engage in profiteering, to accept employment in occupations not advancing the war effort, or just to loaf. On May 17, 1918 the Provost Marshal General issued regulations requiring men in deferred classes "to transfer to useful and effective occupation or else forfeit their immunity of deferment." It was "Work or Fight."[22] A comment of the Provost Marshal General on the relation of this regulation to industrial conscription is pregnant in its implications:

> Yet there was a definite and obvious relation in that the "Work or Fight" order was calculated to supply the experimental foundation for a successful measure of pure industrial conscription had the necessity ever arrived.[23]

World War I: Conclusions

There was little objective appraisal of World War I selective service experiences at the time. Existing records tend to fall into one of three categories: newspaper accounts so infected by hyperpatriotism as to lose their objectivity, official reports prepared with the thought of self-justification in mind, and self-congratulatory memoirs of selective service officials. However, it appears that the system itself operated very satisfactorily in the main. The publicity attendant on Banner Communities tended to perpetuate the odium that was popularly attached to conscription at least since the Civil War since by implication it stigmatized the other communities as being lacking in patriotism. To the extent that it had this effect the publicity given Banner Communities was a mistake. A more serious fault of the system was the basing of quotas on total population

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22Edward A. Fitzpatrick, Conscription and America (Milwaukee, Wisc.: Richard Publishing Co., 1940), p. 67.

23Second Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Selective Service System to December 20, 1918 (Washington: 1919), p. 85.

rather than on draft eligibles. As a result the draft bore more heavily on young men in those communities which had a greater proportion of its population in the older age groups, which had a greater amount of industrial or agricultural deferments, or which had large alien populations.

Whatever the merits of the law and its administration, there is no doubt that it came too late to avoid the unnecessary butchery of American soldiers who were rushed to France to stem the tide of Germany's last great offensive of the war. "...the heavy losses in the Meuse-Argonne can largely be traced to the lack of basic training in our army..."[24] In order for the United States to have had trained men in sufficient quantity to meet its military needs, the selection and training of those men would have had to have begun before, not after, the declaration of war on Germany.

By implication, the Provost Marshal General admits that the original selective service regulations were defective and not conducive to the optimum utilization of the nation's manhood when he writes in discussing the new regulations promulgated on November 15, 1917 that

> Defects could now be corrected and a comprehensive plan capable of meeting any emergency and calculated to make possible a scientific administration could now be brought forward.[25]

In the years following the war the general favorable opinion of selective service as a means for safeguarding the National security is due at least as much to the fact that the United States was victorious as to merit in the selective service system itself.

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[24]Charles Seymour, "Compulsory Military Training," in Peacetime Conscription compiled by Julia E. Johnsen, (New York: The H.W. Wilson Co., 1945), p. 113.

[25]Crowder, op. cit., p. 146.

Between the World Wars

Shortly after the end of World War I there was a strong movement to introduce some type of universal military training into the United States. The bills introduced into Congress finally resulted in the compromise National Defense Act of 1920.[26] Following the passage of this act the American public became more and more pacifistic. Other than at American Legion conventions and in Army reports there was little interest in military training in the period from 1920 through 1939.

However, what interest there was in military training should be noted. The Citizen's Military Training Camps which were held annually during this period were based on the so-called "Plattsburg idea" of the pre-World War I Military Training Camps Association of the United States. In spite of strong opposition to compulsory military training in any college, the Reserve Officers Training Corps program even spread into many high schools throughout the land. There was growing pressure to introduce military training into Civilian Conservation Corps camps, but since this would cause men to bear arms merely because of their economic misfortune, these camps were permitted to retain civilian status.

The National Defense Act of 1920 did not change the training provisions of the existing pre-war acts basically; however, adequate training of officer personnel was given a new impetus through the strengthening of the programs of the Reserve Officers Training Corps and Citizen's Military Training Camps. Coordination and cooperation

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[26] 41 U. S. Stat. at L. (1920), 759.

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[1] If By Chem. as I. (1921), Phil.

between Regulars, Reserves, and National Guardsmen were strengthened; no longer was the professional soldier isolated for fear he might contaminate the citizen soldier. National Guard and Reserve officers were, in effect, given representation on the General staff which was then charged, in conjunction with the Navy, with planning for "mobilization of the manhood of the nation." But the military leaders of the Nation were not fully satisfied with the new act. General Pershing in his report as Chief of Staff observed:

> The Act did nothing to provide for universal training nor for the application of the draft system in future emergencies--two things essential for the security of a country with so small a force.[27]

In 1926, the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee was established to perform the mobilization planning function as directed in the National Defense Act of 1920. Over the next fourteen years this committee developed proposed laws and regulations dealing with selective service and other possible means of raising men for the armed forces in an emergency. Also developed were administrative plans including forms to be used in the event of the passage of a selective service law. Reserve officers were trained for possible duty in a regional selective service headquarters. With the advice and assistance of this committee the National Guard State Staff of the Adjutant Generals of the several States prepared plans for establishing a selective service system within each State. Many of the officers on these State Staffs were later assigned to duty in the State Selective Service Headquarters. To this joint committee and its many members over the fourteen year period should go the credit

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[27] Annual Report of the Secretary of War to the President, 1921 (Washington: 1921), p. 9.

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for the expeditious establishment of the second Selective Service System in 1940.

World War II: Defense Stage

The German invasion of the Low Countries started considerable discussion in and out of Congress on the general subject of conscription. A few days before the surrender of France, President Roosevelt recommended a form of universal compulsory military service which would exclude combat training and duty. Two days later (June 20, 1940) a bill drafted by the Military Training Camps Association was introduced. This bill was proposed to meet the needs of National security through a system of selective compulsory military training.

On September 16, 1940, the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940[28] was approved. This act was based on a bill proposed by the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee; it drew very heavily on the World War I act with several modifications attributable to the fact that the United States was not yet at war. All men between twenty-one and thirty-six years of age were required to register and were subject to training and service for a period not to exceed twelve months, with transfer to the reserve components for not more than ten years. Limitations were placed on the number that could be trained in one year and the number that could be in training at any one time. Men drafted in accordance with this law could not be employed outside of the western hemisphere except in American territories and possessions.

Within thirty days the Selective Service System had been organized, and sixteen and a half million men had been registered.

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[28] 54 U. S. Stat. at L. (1940), 885.

Within another thirty days the lottery to determine the order of induction had been held, and the first selectee delivered to the Army. Although the tempo of war had been greatly speeded up since the Civil War, the tempo of activating a selective service system had not been accelerated; several States in the Confederacy delivered conscriptees to the central government within one month of passage of the Conscription Act of 1862. There was an even greater difference though. The conscriptee of 1862 would be ready to fight with only a few weeks of training at the most; the selectee of 1940 was much further from being an adequate soldier due to the increased complexity of military technology.

In August of the next year, with German armies advancing into Russia, the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 was amended to extend the period of training to two and a half years; this amendment passed the House of Representatives with only a one vote majority. And it was thus that matters stood on December 7, 1941 when the United States was plunged into war with the Japanese surprise attack on Hawaii.

World War II: America at War

The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 was amended frequently up to December 20, 1944. In its final form it provided for the registration of all male persons between eighteen and sixty-five years of age, with those between eighteen and thirty-seven obligated for military service. Legal exemptions were, in general, more restricted than in World War I; conscientious objectors were not exempted but were assigned to non-combatant forms of duty in the national interest. The President was again given broad discretionary

powers in determining which individuals or groups of individuals it would serve the national interest best to defer. Bounties for enlistment, the purchase of exemptions, and substitution were again forbidden. The World War I procedure of permitting the Navy and Marine Corps to recruit volunteers was continued until a year after this country was at war; during this period the Navy and Marine Corps were able to get the pick of the younger men including seventeen year olds while the Army was restricted to such men over eighteen years of age as were inducted by the Selective Service System.

The Selective Service System as a whole was nearly identical to that of World War I with civilian control being even more emphasized. The system was placed under the supervision of the War Manpower Commission, to assure greater coordination in the filling of both military and civilian manpower requirements. Registrants were classified by the local boards on the basis of a comprehensive questionnaire filled out by each registrant. Class I included those registrants available for immediate service, conscientious objectors available for non-combatant military service, and members of the armed forces and their reserve components. Class II included persons deferred because of civilian occupation. Class III included only registrants with dependents. Class IV was comprised of registrants who had completed their service with the armed forces, registrants who were the sole surviving sons of parents whose other children had died in the war, officials deferred by law, aliens, ministers of religion, divinity students, conscientious objectors opposed to non-combatant as well as combatant service, and registrants who were physically, mentally, or morally unfit.

Quotas were assigned to States in proportion to the age distribution of the population. This represents an improvement over the World War I quota system since there is a basic social justice in calling up men throughout the Nation solely on the basis of age. But to the extent that this quota system ignored the requirements of specialized industrial regions for retaining skilled workers, war production goals were jeopardized. Only in the first three months of 1943 did the Selective Service System exceed its quota. During the rest of the war period, calls were never fully met due largely to the high rate of rejection by the Armed Forces.

The latitude of local boards in granting deferments was gradually curtailed as the war progressed. Industrial deferments of persons under the age of twenty-six became practically non-existent, and industrial deferments between the ages of twenty-six and thirty-six were becoming increasingly rare by the end of the war. The "Manning Tables" and "Replacement Schedules" of the War Manpower Commission were designed to provide the Selective Service System with information so that the induction of men of draft age could be so scheduled that war production would not be unduly hampered. The time provided for obtaining a replacement for a man in Class II would vary with the degree of manual and mental skill necessary to perform the job. However, the local boards, lacking an appreciation of the complexities of industrial production, often caused serious manpower problems.

Early in the war, students meeting certain requirements were assigned to educational institutions as part of the Army Specialized Training Program. This often led to the anomaly of giving boys specialized technical training while older men already possessed of

that training were being drafted. By February, 1944 the Army Specialized Training Program was terminated, and only those who would graduate by July 1 or who would complete their courses in designated scientific fields within twenty-four months were retained in the program.

World War II: Conclusions

Although the Selective Service System operated efficiently and effectively throughout World War II, there is a question as to the extent to which it contributed to the increasingly threatening shortage of manpower. There is no question that permitting the Navy and Marine Corps to recruit volunteers for a year after the beginning of hostilities tended to disrupt the balance between civilian and military manpower and to result in leaving the less desirable men for the army. The failure of the draft quotas to take into consideration the number of skilled craftsmen needed for war production in the various areas resulted in the disruption of production in those areas while other areas had adequate reserves of manpower.

The supply of trained scientists and professional men decreased sharply during the war, and failure to adopt a more liberal policy in deferring students in these fields is directly responsible. The Six Committees on Scientific, Professional, and Specialized Personnel stated in their report in 1950 to the Director of the Selective Service System that

> "Our Nation is already suffering from a serious shortage of scientific, professional and specialized personnel resulting from constrictions applied during World War II."[29]

Doctoral degrees in engineering, mathematics, and the physical

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[29] (Washington: October 5, 1950), p. 8.

sciences dropped in 1945 to the level of 1910.

A further contributing factor to the dislocation of manpower was the hyper-critical attitude of the Armed Services toward the physical condition of inductees; approximately one-third of all registrants passed by local boards for induction were rejected at the induction stations. Another large group was accepted by the Armed Services to avoid embarrassing local boards and then given a medical discharge within a short time. These rejectees joined the larger group of men in "safe" draft classifications in confusing the manpower situation since they were free to accept any job without regard to its contribution to the war effort. The tendency for draft-exempt men to gravitate to profitable but non-essential occupations was never frankly faced. A "Work or Fight" order forcing men with dependency deferments into essential industries, in combination with greater use of persons with minor physical defects in non-combatant duties in the Armed Services, would have done much to relieve the manpower situation.

The Selective Service System in World War II is generally conceded to have been an improvement over the World War I system. Experience, as usual, proved to be a good teacher, but even the above brief review of the World War II system points out a reluctance to learn from experience.

The Rush toward Peace:

With the surrender of Japan, discussions of the possible adoption of universal military training to maintain the military power of the United States were pushed into the background. The fathers and mothers, the aunts and uncles, and the wives of servicemen put pressure on the military establishment either directly or through Congress "to

get Johnny home by Christmas." There began an intemperate demobilization that temporarily reduced the military effectiveness of the United States to practically nil. Officers in charge of separation centers had a blank check for whatever they deemed essential in the way of men and materials in order to keep the rate of demobilization high. Fighting divisions were rushed home for discharge leaving their equipment behind them. Fighting ships were left with only skeleton crews. Cargo ships dumped their loads on foreign beaches and raced for home. Billions of dollars worth of American material was left to corrode in tropic rains or under winter snows. By the time order was restored, demobilization had run its rapid but destructive course. It was too late to salvage more than a fraction of all the American material that littered shores and supply dumps throughout the world.

The concept behind selective service was probably as much to blame as anything else for the intemperate demobilization. Military service was to be required only in an emergency. The war had been won; the emergency was over; therefore, the military service should be called to an end. Who wanted to tell the people that a war doesn't end with the final shot? And if someone did, who would listen to him? Only history can judge whether the United States again won the war and lost the peace. But if it is so, then the chaos resulting from the too rapid release of selectees must take a major share of the blame.

New Laws and Proposed Laws

The termination of hostilities brought renewed interest in the form that United States military establishments should take in peace-

time. The bills introduced in Congress ceased to propose universal military training and instead proposed banning compulsory training and service. During 1946 only two bills were introduced to establish universal training while a third would have directed the President to work for an international agreement eliminating compulsory military service in all nations. In December of the same year, the President appointed an Advisory Commission on Universal Training for the purpose of developing a universal training program; the omission of the word "military" was intentional.

On March 31, 1947 the Selective Service System expired to be replaced as of the same date by the Office of Selective Service Records, created in conformity with Public Law 26, 80th Congress.[30] The liquidation of the Selective Service System continued under the new organization. The new office, in addition to its records custody functions, was also charged with preparing and maintaining plans for conscription and related matters. In its very short life the Office of Selective Service Records prepared plans for universal training, nonmilitary training, national service, limited selective service to supplement recruiting, and wartime selective service both for the armed forces and for war industries.

In the same year more bills were introduced into Congress proposing various forms of universal military training. In general these and other bills subsequently introduced provided for superimposing universal military training on the current military establishment. On June 1, 1947, the President's Advisory Commission

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[30] 61 U. S. Stat. at L. (1947), 31.

[illegible]

made its report, which was filed with the many other reports on the subject. Before the year was over, both President Truman and Governor Dewey announced their support of universal military training.

The President requested the enactment of selective service legislation on March 17, 1948, since volunteering had again failed to provide the desired military strength. It was generally agreed that while the Navy and Air Force could maintain their present (Spring 1948) strength by recruiting volunteers, the Army could not. The proposed increased strength could not be attained by any of the services through volunteering, with the possible exception of the Air Force. Three months later, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1948,[31] terminating the Office of Selective Service Records and re-establishing the Selective Service System. If the Selective Service Act of 1948 should ever be allowed to expire, the Office of Selective Service Records would be automatically reestablished thus insuring the continuation of at least a skeleton selective service organization.

The new act provided for the registration of all men from the ages of eighteen through twenty-five, with those from nineteen through twenty-five being subject to induction for twenty-one months service if necessary to maintain the legally established armed force strength. The armed services were required to accept one hundred sixty thousand eighteen-year-old men for one-year service with the regular forces to be followed by a varying period of reserve service; the men who volunteered escaped draft liability under the new act. In other respects the Selective Service Act of 1948 was similar to the final

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[31] 62 U. S. Stat. at L. (1948), 64.

form of the wartime act. However, in practice, the act worked to coerce volunteers, so that no appreciable number of men were drafted until after the United States became involved in the Korea incident.

The Korea Incident

When the United States committed itself to providing the major support for the United Nations effort to expel the North Korean Communists from the Republic of Korea and to unify all of Korea, there were one and a half million men in the American armed forces. Most of these men were so committed to occupation, garrison, training, and other duties that they could not be made available for action in Korea. So few men could be sent to Korea that there was danger of the relatively second-rate North Korean forces driving all United Nations forces into the sea.

In the first four months of action in Korea, recruiting and reserves supplied nearly five hundred thousand men to the armed services while the draft contributed but one hundred thousand men. The goal set for selective service inductions was two hundred fifty thousand men in nine months.[32] The events since the invasion of the Republic of Korea raise considerable doubt as to whether the present system of reserves and selective service would provide adequate security in case of a sudden attack on the United States by a major power.

General Conclusions from American Experience

From American experience it appears obvious that the militia, professional, and volunteer systems, individually and collectively, cannot meet the requirements of American security. Since the Revolu-

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[32]"How you Stand in the Draft," Quick, October 30, 1950, p. 11.

tionary War, volunteering has failed in every major war in which the United States has taken part. Similarly, the militia system failed so often that the present descendent of the original militia, the National Guard, is for most practical purposes a centrally controlled volunteer reserve. And the days are long past when any nation could support a professional army that was large enough (with or without the aid of volunteers and/or militia) to provide adequate military protection. Thus it follows that the United States must rely on some form of conscription which meets the needs of National security, with the least danger to the American way of life, to supplement professional and possibly other types of forces.

The Selective Service System has proven itself to be procedurally adequate. There are still some major problems to be solved. Among the problems still not settled are the utilizing of deferred registrants in essential occupations, volunteering after induction is initiated, and insuring that industrial deferments made by the Selective Service System meet the needs of war industries.

A review of the accomplishments of selective service shows a progressive deterioration. Civil War conscription can be disregarded as being an incentive or coercive force for volunteering rather than a true form of selective service. In World War I selective service was not made effective until after the United States entered the war, and it was nearly one year before American soldiers were an appreciable factor in the war. The United States entered World War II with a selective service system in operation, but, again, it was nearly a year before American troops were committed to action in large numbers, a year of major defeats that were not worse only because of the ineptitude

of the enemy. Even though selective service had been in operation for two years prior to the Korea incident, it was the reserves and militia and not selective service that provided the bulk of the additional forces. In view of the initial reverses suffered by American and Republic of Korea troops, what initial reverses would be suffered by the United States in a war with a major power if American armed forces, reserve and regular, are not modified? Such delay in putting an adequate number of trained men into action not only increases the liklihood of defeat but also prolongs the war and thereby increases casualties.

After the Selective Service System gets into full operation the only initial limiting factor, other than one imposed by law, is the ability of the armed services to absorb untrained men. There is a natural tendency to increase the flow of men through the training camps at the expense of the training given each selectee. General Crowder in his book on selective service wrote:

> We have learned the same lesson in the Civil War, the frightful, bloody truth that untrained levies made a shambles of a skirmish and a butchery of a battle. Up to the Spring of 1917 we had profited nothing by our costly lesson.[33]

That statement may be brought up to date by substituting "1950" for "1917." In military matters the United States has generally failed to profit by experience. Writing about American wars up to the Civil War, General Crowder made a comment that would be equally applicable to all American wars:

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[33] Op. cit., p. 177.

> ...all these wars had been successful in their outcome. With characteristic optimism, Americans did not look beyond the result. The system that had brought ultimate victory was the system that ought to be preserved.[34]

Not only has the United States not profited by experience, it has also failed to take the advice of both political and military leaders as to the best means of raising armed forces. Congress, with few exceptions, has consistently ignored expert opinion on conscription until necessity left no other choice.

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[34] Op. cit., p. 76.

CHAPTER XII

FOREIGN SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEMS

Of the forty-five member nations of the United Nations which had organized military systems in 1947, thirty-eight had compulsory military service, one had a compulsory militia system, and six relied on volunteers to fill their peacetime armies.[1] Prior to World War II, twenty-eight of these countries had compulsory military service, five had a compulsory militia system, and twelve relied on volunteers. Of the countries having compulsory military service, twenty enforced such service only partially before the war, and fifteen of these countries still had only partial enforcement in 1947; the eight members of the United Nations which fully enforced their conscription laws before the war continued to enforce them after the war and were joined by five which had only partially enforced their conscription laws prior to the war. Only one[2] of the five nations relying on a compulsory militia system before World War II still finds that this system meets its needs; the other four countries[3] have adopted a system of compulsory military service which they fully enforce. Half of the member nations which relied on volunteers prior to the war[4] have continued their wartime conscription in more or less modified

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[1]The factual information in this introductory section is taken from "The Question of Universal Training For the United States," The Congressional Digest, 26 (October 1947), 238 and the report of The President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, A Program for National Security (Washington: 1947), appendix 11.

[2]Union of South Africa.

[3]Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.

[4]Cuba, Great Britain, Haiti, Luxembourg, Mexico, and Uruguay.

Chapter Introduction Analysis

of the Standard-Oil complex analysis by the United States Supreme
Court in 1911, established the "rule of reason" which subsequent
utilities commissions, and the U.S. Supreme Court in 1923, have
applied as guidelines for [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible]

form. Two nations[5] continued their volunteer system through the war, and the remaining four countries[6] reverted back to the volunteer system of raising their peacetime armies shortly after termination of hostilities.

With two exceptions[7], those non-member nations which have organized military systems have also enforced compulsory military service in their standing armies both prior to and since World War II. The nations in active alliance with the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis also depended upon compulsory military service. Eire in its quarter century of independent existence has avoided involvement in war due in a great part to its geographical isolation from the remainder of Europe; the volunteer system has been adequate to meet the needs of its relatively small peacetime army. Switzerland has developed its own unique system of compulsory militia service which has been sufficient to discourage all contemplations of invasion for nearly a century and a half. The Swiss system is based on and adapted to the peculiar characteristics of governmental philosophy, terrain, and geographical location of Switzerland.

Of particular interest to this study are the experiences of the nine foreign nations which relied on volunteer systems before World War II and on conscription during the war. These nations may be divided in two ways--first between those nations with an Anglo-Saxon heritage and those without such a heritage, and second between those

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[5]Dominican Republic and India.

[6]Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.

[7]Eire and Switzerland.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

nations which reverted to a volunteer system after the war and those nations which retained a form of conscription after the war. These two divisions are almost identical, since no non-Anglo-Saxon nation reverted to the volunteer system after the war and only one[8] Anglo-Saxon nation retained wartime conscription measures.

As the sole representative of its class, the experiences of Great Britain with conscription during and after two World Wars must be surveyed. Of the three Anglo-Saxon nations which are again finding the volunteer system adequate to their needs, the cultural as well as geographic proximity of Canada to the United States makes it necessary that the Canadian experience with selective service in World War II be investigated. The general similarity of governmental structure between Australia and the United States makes the operation of selective service "down under" of potential instuctional value.

Of the non-Anglo-Saxon nations, only Uruguay, with its strong democratic traditions, is worthy of study; however, information on selective service in Uruguay has not been obtainable even from the Uruguayan Embassy in the United States. Cuba, Haiti, and Luxembourg are too small for their undertakings to be of significance in developing plans for raising the required armed forces of the United States. Mexico has retained conscription primarily as an educational measure rather than as a military measure. Prior to World War II almost 70% of the Mexican population was illiterate; army training was found to be an effective method of reducing this illiteracy rate.

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[8] Great Britain

service, the mighty Great Britain was forced to fight for two and a half years before achieving victory.

As a result of the Boer War, the British army was reorganized in the first decade of the twentieth century. A small standing army was to be backed up by a large and effectively trained reserve force. Enlistments in the regular army provided for a period of duty in the Army Reserve upon completion of the enlistment. A Special Reserve was established as a modern substitute for the militia; members of this Reserve received six months of training in the first year of service and one month of training in each of the next five years. As the second line of defense the Territorial Army was created. Members of this militia group had a four year term of service; they were required to spend fifteen days in camp each year and to participate in twenty drills the first year and in ten drills in each year thereafter. In the opinion of Frederick Scott Oliver[10], the Special Reserve could be considered as only half-trained in 1914, and the Territorial Army was untrained.

During the first year of World War I, Great Britain relied on the volunteer system as the means of obtaining the large number of soldiers she needed. Actually recruitment during this period became less and less voluntary as every form of pressure, including social ostracism, was resorted to in order to get the proper persons into uniform. With the enactment of the National Registration Act on July 15, 1915, a legal basis was provided for the system of coerced volunteering. In accordance with this act all persons between the

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[10] Ordeal by Battle (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1915), pp. 319-20.

ages of sixteen and sixty-five were registered in August of that year. From the data provided from this registration, it was planned to facilitate the recruitment of single men, especially those in non-essential industries, and to accelerate the flow of manpower from non-essential to essential industries. However, the results did not come up to expectations, and with the passage of time the data provided became of less and less value since an adequate system for recording changes was never put into effect. By October, 1915 it had become obvious that registration alone was not the answer to the British manpower and recruitment problems.

The "Derby Plan" proposed by Lord Derby, the director of recruiting, was the next expedient to be tried. Under this plan all men between the ages of eighteen and forty inclusive were placed in one of forty-six groups, based on age and marital status. A campaign was started to get each man to attest his willingness to serve if his group were called. The married groups were promised that they would not be called until all single men not indispensable to industry had been brought into service regardless of whether or not they had attested. A system of exemptions was provided so that the process of attestation would not work to the detriment of the overall national war effort. Success in obtaining attestations was inversely proportional to the imminence of a call to service for the potential attestor. A large number of single men did not attest.

The continued failure of the volunteer system to provide the necessary number of men finally forced the government to adopt conscription with the passage of the First Military Service Act, early in 1916. This act provided that all men between the ages of eighteen

and forty inclusive and single on registration day (August 15,1915) were to be deemed after a date to be specified by the King to have been duly enlisted. This was primarily a device to get the single men out of the way so that married men who had attested could be called into service. In May of the same year conscription was extended to married men. Nearly two years filled with bungling in the field of recruitment at home and with military reverses abroad elapsed between the outbreak of hostilities and the enactment of a conscription law applicable to the entire male population of military age.

But confusion was not at an end. In addition to statutory exemptions from conscription which included all of Ireland, there were five separate independent groups of agencies granting exemptions at one time or another. It was not until April, 1917 that the resulting confusion over exemptions was cleared up by Parliamentary action.[11] No effective procedure for distribution of manpower between industrial and military needs was ever found. The Ministry of National Service, which was established on August 1, 1917, made an attempt to apportion manpower between these conflicting needs, but the years of bungling prior to the adoption of conscription had so disorganized the manpower situation that the task was virtually hopeless. Great Britain was forced into conscription but only after the failure of the volunteer system had done serious damage. Even though she achieved conscription, she never attained scientific selection and apportionment. However, these poorly conceived and administered experiments at

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[11] In the same month conscription was extended to cover all men through the age of fifty.

[illegible] the use of [illegible].

raising troops by both volunteer system and conscription did yield valuable lessons for the United States.

At the end of the World War I emergency period, Great Britain reverted to her traditional volunteer system. The organization of the British army in the period between the wars was basically the same as just prior to World War I. It was only on April 27, 1939, after the Munich pact, that, with great reluctance and over the opposition of the Labour and Liberal Parties, compulsory training and service was reintroduced. All British men were to receive six continuous months of training at some time during their twenty-first year, followed by three and a half years in a reserve or auxiliary force. Just one month prior to the passage of this conscription law, the Prime Minister announced the planned doubling of the Territorial Army. In the opinion of Winston Churchill, this action was little-considered, though well-meant, since equipment was not available to make for more than a paper increase in strength and since the regular army was weakened by the heavy demands on it for instructors.[12] The beginning of hostilities in September of the same year caused this plan to be superseded before it ever really went into effect.

Great Britain: World War II[13]

By the time of the entry of the United States into World War II, selective service was on a wider basis in Great Britain than ever

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[12] The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), pp. 355 and 471.

[13] The information in this section was taken in the main from the following:

"Manpower Control Policies in Great Britain," Monthly Labor Review, 55 (December 1942), pp. 1134-41.

The President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, A Program for National Security (Washington: 1947).

by the time of the publication of the Federal Income Tax Act, [illegible] income tax [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

before had been attempted. It was defined to include industry as well as the armed forces and civil defense; it was truly a system for national service. The system was based on five parliamentary acts which established the broad outlines of policy. The National Service (Armed Forces) Act of 1939 made all men eighteen to forty-one years of age liable for military service. This act was amended in April of 1941 to extend the liability to include service in defense forces. However, if a man were drafted for civil defense, he could no longer be drafted for military service. The National Service Act adopted in December, 1941 extended the draft age to fifty-one, made persons formerely discharged liable for recall, and extended liability for military or civil defense to women as well as men. It was this last act which defined national service to include industrial service as well as the military and civil defense service previously included. Prior to the passage of this act, control of industrial manpower had been based on the provisions of the Emergency Powers (Defense) Acts of 1939 and 1940.

All the above laws conveyed very broad powers to the Government. These broad powers were exercised through detailed directives included in Orders in Council and other regulations. Two series of orders covering registration for military service and registration for employment were designed to provide the information needed to administer the program of national service. The Control of Engagements Orders restricted the right of employees to quit and the right of employers to hire and fire. In order to prevent violation of the spirit of these orders, employers were required to pay an employee his normal wage as long as he reported for work regardless of whether or not work was available. The Essential Work Orders established

priorities and, in conjunction with the Control of Engagement Orders, they acted to direct labor into essential industries and to freeze it there.

Defense Regulation 58A gave the Minister of Labour and National Service power to direct any person to perform any service for which fitted. This power was exercised through local boards and offices which were allowed considerable discretion. All employment actions in essential industries required the approval of the local office; industrial priorities were applied through the decisions of the local boards. Persons not engaged in work connected with the national effort were advised as to the job which they should be performing; since this advice was backed up with the power to direct compliance, it was very effective. A Training for Industry program was given wide publicity but never made mandatory. In general these broad powers were exercised with moderation; however, it did become necessary to order coal miners to leave higher-paying jobs and return to the mines.

Registration of men for military draft followed the basic laws very closely. The first general registration of men for industry was introduced in March, 1941, subsequent to several special registrations for persons with particular skills. Eventually the general register included practically all men from sixteen to fifty-one years of age; in addition special registers were established for key positions such as ship-builders. The lower age limit for drafting men for military service was reduced in two steps from twenty to eighteen years of age. Men through forty years of age were drafted for military service; doctors and dentists were drafted through forty-five years of age. On May 1, 1945, the drafting of men over thirty-one years of age was

discontinued except for specialists.

The legislation which extended liability for military service to women from eighteen to fifty-one years of age specifically exempted married women living with their husbands and women who had their own or an adopted child under fourteen years of age living with them. No woman could be required to use lethal weapons. A Royal Proclamation issued under authority of this act made women from twenty to thirty-one years of age subject to military draft. These age limits were later modified, but only single women between nineteen and thirty years of age were actually drafted. The drafting of women for military service was discontinued a considerable time prior to the termination of hostilities. Almost all women from sixteen through forty-five years of age were required to register with the local employment office. Those not working on vital war work and not having children under fourteen years of age living with them were "advised" as to an appropriate job they should take. Women whose husbands were in the armed forces or working away from home or who had domestic responsibilities were considered to be "immobile" and could not be directed to take a job away from their home locality. All other women were considered to be "mobile" and could be directed to take a job away from home.

As indicated before, sixteen and seventeen year old youths were registered for national service. Boys of this age were urged to participate in some form of pre-service training. General encouragement was given to all youths to devote their free time to the war effort.

In accordance with special international agreements, Belgian, Czech, Dutch, French, Norwegian and Polish nationals living in

Britain were required to register for national service. Registration was also required of Austrian, German, and Italian refugees. These aliens were encouraged to enlist either in their own forces or in the British armed forces. Attempts were made to place in war work all those who did not so enlist.

Deferments from military service were more restricted than in the United States. Initially, deferments were granted to workers in war industries so that the war effort would not be impeded. These deferments for occupational reasons were reduced until finally a man had to be irreplacable in essential war work or other essential service in order to be deferred. Conscientious objectors could not be drafted for military service but were subject to draft for civil defense service. In cases where it was proven that the induction would cause extreme hardship, a relatively short postponement of induction could be granted. Apprentices were deferred until they completed their apprenticeship or reached the age of twenty, whichever occurred sooner. Deferments to complete schooling were granted to some college students, depending on their course of study; these deferred students might be required to take part time jobs to further the war effort. In general the same set of deferment rules that were applied to men were also applied to women.

The acts upon which the drafting and controlling of manpower were based were intended originally to remain in effect until the end of the emergency period following the cessation of hostilities. After the surrender of Japan, controls over manpower were gradually relaxed; men between the ages of eighteen and fifty-one who were normally employed in agriculture, coal mining, building, or civil engineering

were the last ones to remain subject to controls.

On January 1,1947, an interim peacetime plan for drafting men for military service was placed in effect. This plan confined the draft to eighteen year olds and to those nineteen and twenty year olds who had been deferred previously. The period of service was set at twenty-four months, with a reduction of one month on February 1,1948 and every two months thereafter. Thus the inductees in the last month of operation under this interim plan (December, 1948) were required to serve but eighteen months. Women were no longer subject to induction; the auxiliary services were continued on a volunteer basis.

A permanent peacetime conscription law was enacted in 1948, to go into effect on January 1,1949. This act calls for all eighteen year olds to receive twelve months of training followed by six years of reserve service. Non-veterans up to the age of twenty-six are subject to induction. Coal miners are to be exempted from induction; additional groups may be exempted from time to time. Temporary deferments can be granted in hardship cases and to students, apprentices, and doctors and dentists undergoing technical training; however, they all are required to serve their twelve month training period before reaching the age of thirty. Thus Great Britain under the leadership of the traditionally anti-conscription Labour Party has reversed its policy of filling the armed forces with volunteers except in time of war. The reasons that compelled the Labour Government to abandon its long established principles are summed up in a White Paper entitled "Statement Relating to Defense" as follows:

> "The need in the unhappy event of a future war will be for large numbers of reserves available at short notice for the immediate tasks of defence. The process of building up reserves from ex-personnel of regular service is slow and productive of small numbers, though of high quality. In addition to regular reserves, there are volunteer members of auxiliary forces...for which recruitment is beginning and by the speedy reconstitution of which the Government set the greatest store. It is clear, however, that the numbers required can only be provided by a system of national service consisting of a minimum period with the Colors and several years of reserve service."[14]

This same White Paper recognized that men drafted into the peacetime army would have to be treated differently than career volunteers as is indicated in the following quotation:

> "The Government recognise the special responsibilities which they will bear for ensuring that the time spent with the Forces by a young man under the national service scheme will not only serve the main purpose of making him a valuable asset to the country's defence, but will also have a formative and generally helpful effect upon his ability to take his full place as a citizen at the expiry of his term of active service."[15]

Australia[16]

In many ways the government of Australia is very similar to that of the United States, and this similarity makes the Australian experiences with conscription of particular interest. The first settlement in Australia came shortly after the American Revolutionary War when a body of convicts such as had formerly been sent to some of the American

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[14] As quoted by The President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training, A Program for National Security (Washington: 1947), p. 276.

[15] Ibid., p. 280.

[16] The information in this section was taken in the main from the following:

Layton Richards, "Australia Got Rid of Conscription," The Christian Century, LXV (September 1, 1948), 873-5.

Anonymous, "Conscription in Australia," Current History, 4 (March 1943), 39-40.

Colonies were transported to New South Wales. Shortly thereafter settlements were established in the other four colonies in Australia proper and in Tasmania to the south. In 1901 the five Australian colonies and Tasmania became states and formed the present federation called the Commonwealth of Australia. Although the government is divided into federal, state and municipal systems, as in the United States, it follows generally the British parliamentary system of government rather than the American system. Canberra, the Australian capital, is located in federal territory outside of the jurisdiction of any state. As with the American colonies, federation was made difficult by the distances and rivalries between the various states. Like the United States, Australia had the protection of wide oceans, which tends to foster an isolationist attitude.

In an effort to establish a well organized militia, the Labour Government of Australia, in 1910, placed in effect an adaptation of the Swiss system. The conscription provisions of this plan were in defiance of traditional Labour principles and were not supported by the public. Military training was to begin in school at the age of twelve. Boys from fourteen to eighteen years of age were classified as senior cadets. From the age of eighteen to twenty-six, all men were to be members of the Citizen Forces. At the age of twenty-six, they were to be transferred to the Reserve Force where they remained until they reached the age of sixty. The training of the Citizen Forces was to consist of sixteen whole-day drills each year, under the direction of Army instructors. Enforcement of the system was vested in the military department with special judicial procedures and tribunals set up to punish violators.

The system proved ineffective in practice; a part of the blame for this rests with the reliance on compulsion rather than on public support to effectuate the planned system. Twice during World War I, the Australian people voted to retain the ban on the use of members of the Citizen Forces overseas without their consent. After 1920 the law was breached more often than it was observed. The trained strength of the Citizen Forces fell from one hundred twenty-seven thousand in 1921 to a mere forty-eight thousand in 1929. In the latter year, Australia's signing of the "Pact of Paris" gave the government a good excuse to suspend the enforcement of the 1910 law.

In World War II, Australia relied upon volunteers to meet its commitments. After Japan's entry into the war; conscription was reintroduced, but drafted men could not be sent overseas without their consent. The boundaries within which militia and drafted men could be sent were extended from time to time by law and proclamation. A large segment of the legislature and the public favored the removal of all geographical restrictions on the use of these men, but an Opposition bill to do this was narrowly defeated in the lower house of the legislature on a vote along party lines in 1943. At the end of active hostilities, the conscription law was permitted to lapse.

Canada[17]

At the time of the British conquest, Canada was even more sparsely settled than the American Colonies to the south. The new British regime made every effort to placate the French Canadians even to the

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[17] Information on conscription in Canada is readily obtainable from general reference works and from the various weekly news magazines. Of special value was The Canadian Forum, volumes XVII thru XXIV, which not only presents facts but also presents sympathetically the viewpoint of

Empire were of more importance. This conflict between Canadian nationalism and the Empire viewpoint is basic to the problems Canada has had in writing and in enforcing selective service laws. The strength of nationalism among the French Canadians is due as much to their longer residence in Canada as to their French traditions. This nationalism is a potent factor for disunity in Canada.

At the onset of World War I, Canada relied on volunteers to raise an expeditionary force. However, by 1917 when the goals established by the Conservative government were not filled by volunteers a Compulsory Military Service Act was enacted conscripting men between the ages of twenty and forty-five. This act was passed over the opposition of the leader of the Liberal Party who believed that Parliament should not enact conscription without holding a referendum on the question. In this crisis, Parliament was dissolved and a coalition cabinet formed, including the English speaking portion of the Liberal Party. The subsequent elections resulted in a sweeping victory for the coalition and in leaving Quebec unrepresented in the cabinet. Attempts to enforce conscription in the Spring of 1918 resulted in serious riots, particularly in Quebec City where several people were killed. The resultant division and misunderstanding between the English and the French over this question were played upon by rabble-rousing politicians for their own selfish benefit in the period between the World Wars, and even Canadian entry into World War II did little to restore unity on this question.

During the period of international tension preceding World War II, the question of increased military expenditures was warmly debated in Canada. Beneath the name-calling, there was fairly general agreement on some of the basic factors involved. It was considered improbable

that, in a general war, Canada would be directly attacked until her major allies had been overwhelmed. Both the Atlantic and Pacific coastlines were viewed as being relatively easy to defend because of unfavorable terrain and well-protected sea approaches. It was also generally agreed that the United States would not tolerate a foreign invasion of Canada, but the fact was overlooked that Canada might be chosen as the avenue of an attack on the United States even as France was invaded through Belgium in World War I.

With these facts agreement ended. One school of thought, represented by a majority in Quebec and a very strong minority in the other provinces, stressed the independence of Canada. They believed that Canada could stay out of a general war just as the Scandinavian countries, Holland, and Switzerland had maintained their neutrality in World War I; they did not feel themselves morally or legally bound to follow the lead of Great Britain in foreign policy or to come to her aid in case of war. It therefore followed that the emphasis of this group was upon defense and upon sea and air power to ward off invasion. They advocated an increase in Canadian armament productive capacity rather than any immediate increase in armaments themselves. In the majority was the group which felt that Canada was morally bound to come to the aid of any other nation in the British Commonwealth of Nations which became involved in any war other than one arising from its own aggressive actions. It was felt that an aggressor would be little impressed or influenced by Canadian expressions of neutrality. In addition, if Great Britain were at war, trade within the Empire would be so affected as to make it difficult if not impossible for Canada to maintain her neutrality. This group emphasized land forces,

looking to Great Britain to provide the bulk of the necessary sea and air forces. While the Canadian armament industry was not overlooked by this school of thought, they placed more emphasis on the purchase of British-made armaments than did the Nationalist group.

With relatively little debate, Canada followed the lead of Great Britain in declaring war on Germany in September 1939. During the following winter, the absence of military activity resulted in the absence of a sense of urgency in the development and execution of preparedness plans. In the manpower field, the only action of particular importance was the registration of all men and women over the age of sixteen for war service. This registration met scattered opposition on the grounds that it was the first step toward conscription. The statements of Prime Minister King to the effect that conscription would not be necessary were not received with much credence by this opposition since similar statements had been made by the World War I Prime Minister prior to enactment of a selective service law.

With the collapse of allied forces on the continent of Europe in the second quarter of 1940, the necessity of granting emergency powers to the government became obvious. Again with relatively little disagreement, Parliament passed the National Resources Mobilization Act. This act outlined policy in broad terms leaving details to the discretion of the government. Authority was granted for the duration of the then existing state of war to draft both manpower and property; manpower so drafted could not be required to serve in the armed forces outside of Canada. Requirements were established for the publication of orders and regulations issued under authority of this act, and limitations were set on the penalties that could be imposed for violations of these

orders and regulations.

As time wore on, the clamour for conscription for overseas service increased in volume as the danger of Canada's failing to meet the government quotas for volunteers became greater. However, in Quebec, opposition to conscription continued strong. They believed that Canada should devote her primary energy to the production of war supplies and that all men who could be spared for the armed forces could be raised by volunteering.

In an effort to solve the problem of conscription, a plebiscite was held in May, 1942. Quebec voted better than five to two against conscription; the rest of Canada voted better than four to one in favor. The overall vote was better than five to three in favor of conscription for overseas service. This left the government in a dilemma since Quebec expected that her negative vote should be treated as an absolute veto regardless of the vote in the rest of Canada. In this political crisis, a compromise was devised which pleased no one but which did at least prevent the collapse of the government. With promises that he would not use the power granted, the Prime Minister proposed the repeal of the geographical restriction on the use of conscripts. This bill passed the lower chamber of Parliament in July by a vote of one hundred fifty-eight to fifty-four; the opposition included forty-five Quebec members of the Prime Minister's party. After this vote, the French Canadian members of Parliament again cooperated with the government. The Opposition Parties could no longer attack the Liberal Party on its conscription policies so readily since technically the use of conscripts overseas without their consent was no longer a political problem but a military one.

Late in 1944, the high incidence of casualties in Canadian Expeditionary Forces made for a serious prospective shortage of reinforcements if the rate of volunteering could not be materially increased. The presence of seventy thousand trained conscripts who would not volunteer for overseas duty was a source of irritation and low morale to men in all branches of the armed services and of discord at home. Defense Minister Ralston resigned when his demand for the use of these seventy thousand "zombies" overseas was rejected.

Upon the failure of an intensified campaign for volunteers, Prime Minister King was forced into a corner on the conscription question; in December he announced that "zombies" would be sent overseas to the extent necessary. This compromise pleased no one; English-speaking Canada wanted all of the reluctant conscripts to be sent overseas, and Quebec wanted only volunteers to be sent out of the country. Charges were made that army officers had hindered volunteering so that conscription for overseas duty would become necessary and that Quebec was trying to rule Canada. The compromise was greeted by civilian and military disturbances. There was general dissatisfaction with the government in Parliament, but no one else could or would form a new government.

The administrative organization for selective service in Canada was reminiscent of the Civil War system in the United States. Canada was divided into thirteen administrative divisions by grouping the federal electoral districts into thirteen groups. The chief administrative officer in each division was a registrar responsible to the Minister of Labour. Each division also had a Mobilization Board appointed by the federal government; the primary function of these

boards was to adjudicate applications for postponement of induction into service. Postponements were permitted for reasons basically similar to those for which deferments were granted in the United States at the same time; indefinite postponements were sharply limited. The regulations established exemptions from military service for certain classes of public officials, certain aliens, and members of the clergy including divinity students. Minimum medical standards for conscripts were established.

The selective service regulations were revoked in August, 1946. The peacetime forces today are composed of career personnel in the regular forces and volunteers in the reserve forces, which constitute the bulk of the ground forces. Training in the reserve force is on a part-time basis.

Conclusions from Foreign Experience

Much of the foreign experience with selective service systems tends to reinforce the conclusions drawn from American experience. In general, foreign nations have relied on selective service for one of two reasons. (1) Among nations with Anglo-Saxon traditions in particular, popular opposition to conscription prevented governments from resorting to conscription except in time of emergency; i.e. the only form of conscription which was popularly acceptable was selective service. (2) Inability to defend themselves from powerful neighbors under any system of national defense caused some small nations to disregard military preparations until war was upon them. The second of these two reasons is unimportant for the purposes of this study. The first forms a parallel with American experience.

The popular opposition to peacetime conscription often is

strengthened by geographical isolation, protection afforded by allies, or both. The British people placed undue reliance on the English Channel as a guarantee that they could not be invaded. The Canadian people found strength in two oceans and two allies, Great Britain and the United States. The Australian people felt safe, surrounded by seas controlled by the British Fleet. Premature adoption of conscription in the face of strong opposition was fraught with danger. Australia's early experiment with a compulsory militia has built up antipathies and prejudices that only time or a great and present danger can remove. Even though Canada's first experiment with conscription was during World War I, the popular discontent engendered by it was a strong factor in reducing the size and effectiveness of Canada's contribution in World War II a generation later.

The success that countries relying on selective service have had in war can be attributed more to other factors than to the selective service system. Great Britain was brought to the brink of defeat by her unpreparedness. Without minimizing the part played by Australia and Canada in the war, it can be safely said that these dominions were victorious solely because they were on the victorious side. This holds even more true for the remaining nations which had no peacetime conscription prior to World War II. Of all foreign nations which have relied on selective service, only Great Britain is in a situation similar to that of the United States; the situation that a major power finds itself in cannot be paralleled in a smaller nation. And Great Britain now has found selective service to be inadequate and has adopted a system of peacetime conscription.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

The evaluation of the adequacy of the United States selective service system to provide for the security of the United States does not provide a clear cut answer. Even limiting the future period of under consideration does not clarify the problem materially. The same set of facts about the past effectiveness of selective service is offered by opposing factions as proof of their conflicting contentions. This is an area in which there is little black or white, but instead many shades of gray. It is these shades of gray that this chapter is designed to develop.

In an attempt to find facts on which to base a final conclusion, it should not be overlooked that opinion may be more important than fact. The neighborhood bully seldom bothers the boy who looks bigger and stronger than he; the bully preys on the smaller boys. Similarly an international bully seldom attacks the nation that in the bully's opinion might defeat him. Thus if a selective service system looked like a sign of weakness to the eyes of a potential enemy, it might contribute to the causes of a war as well as to the causes of victory or defeat in that war.

No system of raising an armed force can guarantee the continued existence of the United States as a democracy. Any conclusion must be based on an adaptation of the legal principle of "reasonable doubt." A pedestrian crossing a street under normal conditions cannot

be sure beyond a shadow of a doubt that he will safely reach the other side of the street, but he can be reasonably sure. However, if he tries to jaywalk through fast and heavy traffic across a main thoroughfare at a curve on a dark and rainy night, he can no longer be reasonably sure of reaching the other side of the street in safety. He is gambling. But no nation can afford to accept or retain a system of obtaining military forces that involved such a colossal gamble. "It seems improvident to wait until the need has been proved by the painful process of failure. The curses of many dead nations lie upon the procrastination of statesmen..."[1]

Advantages of Selective Service System

The argument that the selective service system brought the United States victory in two World Wars cannot be overlooked. This argument is often stated in the negative; i.e. that the United States has never had universal military training and has never lost a war. But is there a cause and effect relationship here? Or is it an "in spite of" relationship? The survey of American experience in Chapter II strongly indicates that the latter is more likely to be true. However, it must be remembered that the arguments used against selective service today were the same ones used prior to World War II also. The effects of changes in technology and changes in the military potential of our allies were exaggerated then. This leads to a reasonable suspicion that there is a similar exaggeration today. American success in two World Wars provides, at the very least, a strong rebuttal to many of the purported disadvantages of selective service.

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[1]Frederick Scott Oliver, Ordeal by Battle (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd, 1915), p. 380.

The system of selective service is generally viewed as a democratic approach to the problem of raising military forces. Liability for service is equally upon all men; men are called for service in accordance with general principles set by their representatives in the legislature. Application of these principles is made by an executive branch of the government which acknowledges its responsibility to the people as a whole. But does not democracy also impose a requirement for the maximum possible equality of risk in fulfilling this obligation? And can the personal risk be said to be as equal as possible when the first of the selectees have always been sent into battle inadequately trained? General Henry Lee of Revolutionary War fame said, "A government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and disiplined for battle."[2]

Selective service is not an instrument of an autocracy; it is most often a democratic compromise between the need for universal military training and popular disinclination for such training. The mere fact that it is the result of democratic procedures does not mean that it in itself is democratic. However, the fact that selective service has been used only by democracies must be recognized as an advantage of that system as far as the United States or any other democracy is concerned.

It has been claimed by many of the leading exponents of selective service and opponents of universal military training that material and not manpower is the real limiting factor in expanding armed forces in

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[2] As quoted by George B. Conroy in Universal Obligatory Military Training and Service (New York: National Security League, n.d.), p. 18.

time of emergency. It is contended that maintaining adequate stockpiles of munitions embodying on a current basis the latest technological improvements would be far too costly in money and that sending trained troops into battle with obsolete weapons would be far too costly in men. These exponents of selective service demonstrate in very conclusive fashion that men can be trained in less time than it takes to manufacture the equipment they will need. The rebuttal to this argument is not necessarily as valid as it is obvious; it is that men cannot be trained to use equipment until equipment is available. A more important counter-argument is that the rate of technological advance in the methods and material of warfare is slower in peacetime than the proponents of selective service would have us believe.

Another advantage claimed for selective service is its low cost. Under selective service men are called when they are needed and in the number needed. Time, effort, and money are not wasted in training men whose services will never be needed. Obviously selective service has a negligible cost in peacetime. Equally obviously selective service increases the cost of both material and men in the war period since there is no stockpile of trained men and material from which to draw. But whether selective service is less costly over the long haul is a disputed point. The proponents of selective service emphasize training for skills in this argument; their opponents claim that specific skills are quickly and easily learned and that the really important training, involving the learning of discipline and how to live in the military service, takes more time.

Proponents of selective service claim that, since it is a weapon of defense and not of aggression, it will convince major powers

of the peaceful intentions of the United States and will not interfere with United States' friendship with smaller nations in the same manner as universal military service. This argument that selective service will tend to prevent war is based on the assumption that all governments and peoples wish to avoid war, are not aggressors, and are willing to accept peaceful settlements of disputes. It denies that military strength is the most effective method of avoiding war.

Disadvantages of Selective Service System

The primary disadvantage of selective service is well summarized by a statement of Frederic L. Huidekoper that "adequate preparation for war has never yet in history been made after the beginning of hostilities without unnecessary slaughter, unjustifiable expense and national peril."[3] This has been particularly true in American experience. With the possible exceptions of the wars with Mexico and Spain respectively, the United States has never been in conflict with a foreign power in which the conflict was not prolonged and made more costly by the initial deficiencies in preparedness.

These initial deficiencies have in fact been made more serious in the two World Wars by the strain that the selective service system placed on the armed forces then in being in the United States. The need for experienced officers and men to perform the increased administrative duties of the rapidly expanding military establishment, to train selectees, and to form cadres about which new units could be built caused a serious drain on the forces otherwise available and competent to meet enemy attacks. This has been equally true for Great

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[3] Ibid., p. 20.

Britain as for the United States in both World Wars.[4] The usual rebuttal that future initial assaults will be made by air and thus that large naval and ground forces will not be needed at this stage reflects an enthusiasm for air power not yet fully proven in either theory or practice. Over thousands of years of military history, it has been repeatedly predicted that a new form of warfare was making the infantry obsolete. But the next war found more rather than less need for infantrymen.

The activating of a selective service system at the same time that the civilian economy is being rapidly converted from a peacetime to a wartime basis invariably results in a lack of coordination between civilian and military requirements. Both civilian and military planners have been too much occupied with solving their own problems to have a full realization of the problems they were creating for each other. It is suggested that this lack of coordination may be eliminated either through a permanent selective service law or through advance planning. However, the enactment of a permanent selective service law which would be reasonably adequate when an emergency arose would probably be unrealistic politically. Similarly, advance planning would, in the future as in the past, be negated to a large extent by legislative modifications, if not completely ignored.

Opponents of selective service claim that current weakness encourages aggression; i.e. that the possibility that the United States will not have time to make selective service effective, tempts aggressor nations. French intervention in Mexico during the Civil

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[4] World War I: Oliver, op. cit., p. 322.
World War II: Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), p. 471.

War is often cited in proof of this general thesis. It is further claimed that as the tempo of war increases, doubts about the effectiveness of selective service also increase, thereby increasing the temptation to aggressor nations to take action that the United States and other law-abiding nations cannot tolerate. Hanson W. Baldwin, military analyst of the New York Times, has stated that "offense has such an edge over defense that the greatest hope of victory or avoiding attack is the threat of tremendous and overwhelming retaliation."[5] Owen J. Roberts, former Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, contends that the "military unpreparedness of the United States was a major factor in making the last two wars possible."[6] Father Walsh of Georgetown University claims specifically that German Foreign Minister von "Ribbentrop incited the Japanese to strike because 'America is not ready.'"[7]

As previously stated,[8] selective service is a compromise. In the opinion of its opponents, the conditions that required the compromise no longer obtain. And further, the conditions that made the compromise successful also no longer obtain. In the Congressional Digest article previously cited, Paul H. Griffith, then the National Commander of the American Legion, sums up the arguments of opponents of selective service by saying, "Next time there will be no sparring period for all-out mobilization. Those who are not ready to fight will not fight at all."[9]

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[5]"The Question of Universal Military Training for the United States," The Congressional Digest, 26 (October, 1947), p. 245.

[6]Ibid., p. 248.

[7]Ibid., p. 254.

[8]Supra, p. 69.

[9]p. 246.

Selective Service and the Militia

The militia system has proved itself inadequate to meet fully all American needs in major wars in which this country has been involved even when used in conjunction with professional and volunteer forces. The Revolutionary War was prolonged by temporal and geographical restrictions on the use of militia. In the War of 1812, the conduct of the militia was a national disgrace. In the Civil War, the inadequacy in numbers of the militia was accentuated by restrictions on its use. In the two World wars, the militia played a relatively minor role. For practical purposes, the National Guard along with other reserve organizations operated more in conflict than in coordination with selective service. National Guard units have not, generally speaking, been kept on a "ready" basis. A training and organizing period was necessary before a unit was available for combat. During this training period, these units required the services of career officers and men as instructors and advisors thereby reducing the effective strength of the armed forces at a time when that strength was already dangerously low. Since the war, as in the South during the Civil War, the National Guard has become a refuge for draft-evaders.[10] This competition between the militia and conscript forces can be found in British as well as American experience. Frederick Scott Oliver found that the effort to bring the British militia up to proper standards of training early in World War I resulted in serious officer shortages.[11] Winston S. Churchill has commented that "The little-considered, though well-meant, doubling of the Territorial

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[10] Bernard Cutler, "/Brig. Gen. Hampton Anderson/ Sees State Militia as Draft Hide-out," The Columbus Citizen, October 25, 1950, p. 8, col. 2.

[11] Op. cit., p. 322.

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Army in March, 1939, and the creation of the militia in May of that year, both involved drawing heavily upon the Regular Army for instructors."[12]

Two other reasons have contributed to the inadequacy of the militia in the United States. The division of control between Federal and State governments is not conducive to the highest efficiency or to uniformity. The National Guard is a State organization whose independence from Federal interference is jealously guarded in some areas. The Federal Government attempts to maintain standards by contributing almost one hundred per cent of the financial needs of those units which meet federal standards. However, the political implications of withdrawing support from one or more States makes this control less strong than surface appraisal would indicate. Furthermore, many men join the National Guard for the social or financial benefits and not for the purpose of contributing to the national defense. These men are often happy to take the benefits in peacetime and equally eager to find reasons for avoiding the responsibilities in wartime.

A decreasing number of opponents of conscription have advocated the adoption of some modification of the Swiss system of compulsory militia. The Swiss system was developed over a long period of time by a people with strong democratic traditions and a firm belief in the necessity of all citizens cooperating in the defense of their liberties. Their geographical location not only created peculiar problems for military operations but also gave rise to a sense of an ever-

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[12] Op. cit., p. 471.

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[12] Ibid., p. 483.

present danger. A modification of the Swiss system has succeeded in South Africa because a sufficient proportion of the factors present in its development in Switzerland were also present in South Africa; of primary importance perhaps was the feeling of the dominant white population that it was under an ever-present danger from the numerically superior black population. However, adaptations of the Swiss system failed in the United States early in the Nineteenth Century and in Australia in the period just before and after World War I; they failed because the conditions under which they were being applied were not sufficiently similar to the conditions under which the parent system originally developed to warrant its imitation. Even in Switzerland today, the Swiss system of compulsory militia is tending to lose its local characteristics and become more and more a system of universal military reserve service.

From this it seems safe to conclude that the militia system is inadequate by itself, that it has proven itself inadequate as a means of reinforcing armed forces made up of professionals and volunteers, and furthermore that it is in such competition and conflict with the various forms of conscription as to make them incompatible if the maximum efficiency in the utilization of manpower is to be obtained.

Selective Service and the Professional

Other than for a few diehard supporters of the militia system and a few more unrealistic pacifists, there is complete agreement that some form of professional armed service is essential for adequate security. There is considerable conflict of opinion over the appropriate size of the professional or standing armed services and over the the division of strength among the various component services.

An examination of the second of these conflicts would be inappropriate in this present study; however, a general survey of the area of the first should aid in defining the relationship between conscript forces and professional forces. There are three general views on the desirable size for standing forces as follows:

1) A small, compact force capable of overwhelming striking power.

2) A huge force capable of successful offensive action against any foe with little or no help, and

3) A cadre about which an adequate force can be built.

The exponents of the small, compact force claim that the day of the mass army has passed. This view was particularly strong just after the German blitzkrieg victories in Poland, the Low Countries, and France. These campaigns were won by relatively few panzer divisions against an army practically archaic in organization, tactics and equipment in the case of Poland and an army with a defense complex in the case of France. If the Poles had been armed only with bows and arrows, it would have taken even fewer panzer divisions to defeat them. If the French had paid as much heed to the advice of General de Gaulle as the Germans did, the Battle of France might have been a Battle of Germany six months earlier, or there might even have not been a war at all. The whole concept of the small, well equipped, hard and fast striking force as a permanent guarantee of national security for the United States is based on the premise that the American technology and tactics of warfare will always be several jumps ahead of any potential enemy. In view of the well known tendency of a bureaucracy, military or civilian, to become self-satisfied and resistant to change, this assumption seems ill-advised even if the inherent general tech-

nological superiority of the United States were to be assumed.

The second alternative, the huge standing force, is both too costly and too dangerous. In order to attain the relatively small force that was shown to be inadequate by the Korean incident, it was found necessary to rely on selective service. To increase the incentives, particularly the pay rates, so as to make career service attractive to a large enough number of men and women would impose too great an economic strain upon the Nation. Even if such a force could be economically attained, it would be a threat to democratic government. "In theory it is possible to have a great standing army without danger of militarism, but in practice the great standing army and militarism go hand in hand."[13]

Thus the third alternative remains as the only practical choice. Henry L. Stimson well defined the functions of this cadre force when he said that "we shall always need a small regular army, not only to serve as a nucleus and training corps for our citizens, but to be what we call our first line or emergency defense, both against internal disorder and against invasion, and also to perform the expeditionary service, occasion for which, in our development as a great power in the world, has become increasingly frequent."[14] To these functions might be added that of military intelligence and planning.

Selective Service and the Volunteer

In no major war has the United States been able to augment its

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[13] Conroy, op. cit., p. 11.

[14] Ibid., p. 15.

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standing forces satisfactorily with volunteers alone. "The majority of citizens.../are not/... of the moral fiber that volunteers in time of war."[15] It is easy for most men to rationalize their failure to volunteer. They feel themselves to be of greater service elsewhere. They have previously been in service; it is the other fellow's turn now. Or their health is too delicate. This rationalization explains in part the rush to claim or to get into a position to claim exemption from the draft during World War II.

If enough men would volunteer to meet the military requirements, that volunteering would be at the expense of the overall national effort. "Industry must be maintained efficiently if armies are to fight effectively."[16] General Crowder goes on to conclude that volunteering proceeds without regard for industrial needs and eventually results in a maldistribution of manpower between the military and civilian occupations. This tends to show the desirability of a National Service Act similar in principle to that of Great Britain in World War II.

Since selective service and other forms of conscription attempt to reconcile military and civilian needs, the continuation of volunteering in wartime by groups subject to conscription tends to undo the beneficial aspects of conscription in regulating the manpower situation. Perhaps even more serious is the lowered morale and national unity resulting from the odium still popularly attached, when volunteering is permitted to continue, to the conscript and to the healthy.

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[15] Enoch H. Crowder, The Spirit of Selective Service (New York: The Century Co., 1920), p. 196.

[16] Loc. cit.

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draft-exempted or deferred men. This popular pressure, in addition to stirring up contention in and out of the military services, coerces volunteers who might best be left in civilian occupations and thereby further increases the maldistribution of manpower.

Volunteering might safely be continued for women and older men who are not subject to conscription. Even then, proper safeguards would need to be erected to prevent the volunteering of persons who would have been deferred if they had been subject to conscription. Otherwise an unnecessary element of weakness might be introduced into the manpower problem which is always critical in wartime.

Selective Service and Universal Military Training

In disputes over the relative merits of selective service and universal military training and/or service, the proponents of selective service are sure to point out, sooner or later, that universal military training did not bring victory to Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, and a host of other countries while selective service did bring victory to Great Britain and the United States. In their enthusiasm over this line of argument, they usually fail to ascertain whether there is a cause and effect relationship present. Belgium obviously could not have defended herself against Germany regardless of what method she used to raise an army. Certainly France, Italy, Germany, and other countries were defeated even though they had universal military training, but there is no evidence to show that selective service would have been an improvement.

The advocates of compulsory training often find themselves in a cross-fire on the charge of militarism. One school of thought contends that permanent compulsory military training breeds the spirit of mili-

tarism. They cite Germany as an example of this, again without distinguishing between cause and effect. On the other hand, a second school of thought believes that universal military training creates an aversion to military service that would adversely affect the ability of the United States to defend itself. Perhaps both are sufficiently true to cancel out the other. It has not been so long ago that selective service was called militaristic, un-American, and un-democratic; these are labels too often applied to something, free public schools for example, merely because it is new or different. Public interest in any program of conscription should prove to be an adequate safeguard against that program's developing a too militaristic attitude.

There is little question but that universal military training costs more than selective service in peacetime and costs less in wartime. The long range comparative cost between these two systems is dependent on whether or not the military strength inherent in a program of universal military training will prevent wars. If it does, it will be cheaper not only in dollars but also in the more precious commodity, lives.

Selective service emphasizes training in skills; universal military training emphasizes behavior training. Rupert Hughes has well illustrated this point in the following quotation:

> The arguments of the pacifists and the Perpetual Peacemongers need not be aired or answered, except for one - that in military training what you learn soon becomes obsolete. That's true only of the details, the weapons and other materiel. The vitally important thing is the instilling of the spirit of discipline, of military teamplay, of coordination, of automatic obedience in the chain of command...[17]

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[17] Quoted in Peacetime Military Training, edited by Bower Aly (Columbia, Mo.: Lucas Brothers, 1945), p. 30.

In the recent past and present, American military forces, with exceptions such as the Marine Corps, have not been well disciplined. Selective service training has not had the time to give more than a veneer of discipline. No matter how well developed skills are, they are of little value without discipline. The justification of the lack of discipline by calling attention to the greater initiative of the American serviceman begs the question. Proper discipline channels, rather than destroys, initiative. In the future there is likely to be more need for disciplined men. Atomic warfare will without a doubt bring war to all the people. Each community will need disciplined men to restore order, to combat hysteria, and perhaps to organize counter-offensive activities. Selective service, by definition, is not likely to provide disciplined men among the civilian population. After a period of years, universal military training can provide them in the persons of the men who have been trained and who are above the maximum age for active service.

Selective service emphasizes the productive strength of the country; universal military training emphasizes the manpower. When Croesus boasted to Solon of his riches claiming that because of them he could not be defeated, Solon replied that Croesus would keep his gold only until someone came along with more iron. It was true that gold would buy military strength, but Croesus did not have time to make that purchase when the Persians under Cyrus invaded his kingdom. Similarly, productive strength can create military strength if given enough time. But will the United States have enough time to turn its gold of industrial productivity into the iron of trained and equipped military manpower? Or will the United States go down to

defeat like Croesus did?

Selective Service and Universal Military Service

Much of what has been said in the preceding section will apply to this section also. Universal military service has few advantages, if any, over universal military training. The criticisms of compulsory training become more pertinent when applied to compulsory service. For example, the threat of militarism would be greater, and the cost would be greater under the latter. To justify universal military service, it would be necessary to show that both selective service and universal military training were inadequate. While there is evidence that points to the probable inadequacy of the first, there is no such evidence in regard to the second.

Universal military service possesses one major disadvantage. Once the limit of training has been reached, there would not be sufficient profitable work for the conscripts to do to avoid a plague of idleness. The limit of training would vary with individuals, and for some might never be reached. But for almost all men, it would become increasingly difficult to motivate them to learn. Without that motivation, training would become a boring time-filler. Compulsory service would thus constitute training in loafing. Since training cannot exist without service and vice-versa, it follows that any program of universal military training must include a certain amount of the aspects of universal military service. To avoid the training-in-loafing evil, the service features should be limited to that required to develop skills and to perform functions that need doing, i.e. not just "busy work."

If the compulsory training period were to be followed by a period of compulsory reserve service, the resultant system would not be one

of universal military service. Such reserve service is more of a device for maintaining training than for service. Thus it might more properly be considered as an adjunct to universal military training than as a form of universal military service.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATION

Will a selective service system of conscription meet the military needs of the United States? From the evidence set forth the only reasonable answer is, "Probably not." Selective service has been successful in the past in situations where the nation relying on it has enjoyed protection through allies, from geographical location, or from both sufficient to give that nation adequate time to put the system into effect. The protection given the United States by its geographical location is becoming progressively less. At the same time the allies of the United States have been growing relatively weaker over the past half-century. It is already questionable whether allies and oceans together will give the United States time to prepare for successful defense in another war; if present trends continue, the United States will shortly become nearly as vulnerable as if neither oceans nor allies existed. The following quotation from the British government's White Paper entitled "Statement Relating to Defense" presented in Parliament on February 14, 1947 is equally applicable to the United States:

> The need in the unhappy event of a future war will be for large numbers of reserves available at short notice for the immediate task of defense. The process of building up reserves from ex-personnel of regular service is slow and productive of small numbers, though of high quality. In addition to regular reserves, there are volunteer members

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> of auxiliary forces ... for which recruitment is beginning and by the speedy reconstitution of which the Government set the greatest store. It is clear, however, that the numbers required can only be provided by a system of national service consisting of a minimum period with the Colors and several years of reserve service.[1]

In presenting the following recommended program, it is recognized that none of the points in the program are original in themselves. There has been so much written on the general subject of conscription that to avoid some duplication of the analyses and conclusions of others is impossible. However, the author has not found any one program for military service which includes more than sixty per cent of the following five general recommendations by more than implication. It is contended that, in view of the evidence and conclusions heretofore adduced, a program based on the following five points would, as adequately as possible, provide for the military security of the United States as a democratic nation:

1. Professional Armed Services made up of career personnel performing normal peacetime functions, training functions, and planning functions.
2. Universal Military Training of all males shortly after the normal age for graduation from high school.
3. Universal Military Reserve Service for all males upon completion of their training period.
4. Modification of the present reserve program so that it serves the purpose of implementing point three rather than being an end in itself.

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[1] As quoted by the President's Advisory Commission on Universal Training in A Program for National Security (Washington: 1947), p.276.

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5. Selective non-combatant service for both women and older men so as to make available the maximum number of fighting men for fighting jobs.

Under this program, the first line of defense would be the professional forces plus the fully trained conscripts who had not yet completed their training period. The second line of defense would be the new reserve force. The third line of defense would be the men released for combat duty by selective service of women and older men.

The need for career personnel as the basis for a military system in the United States seems so obvious as to require no explanations or justification. The size of the professional Armed Forces would be dependent upon the number of men necessary over a period of time to perform the required functions, the number of men meeting the qualification requirements who are attracted to a career in the Armed Services by the incentives offered, and the funds made available subject to limitations from both the economic and political standpoint. The delineation in broad terms of the required functions, of the number of men necessary to perform each of those functions, of the qualification requirements, of the necessary incentives, and of the funds available may be fairly generally agreed upon in each instance; as the delineation becomes more specific it will be agreed to less generally. With the exception of the incentives offered, the factors determining the size of the professional Armed Forces are set only in general terms by Congress. Congress determines in considerable detail the incentives offered such as pay, opportunity for promotion, housing, retirement, and the like. Therefore preventing the incentives offered, especially intimes of instability and inflation, from lagging too far

behind the incentives required in order to keep the Armed Services at the desired size may prove to be the major problem in maintaining an adequate professional force.

The conclusion to Chapter II[2] stated that conscription was a requirement of American security. Earlier in this chapter[3] it was concluded that the selective service system was probably inadequate already. Therefore, the choice remains between universal military service and universal military training. In either case the training will be necessary; as contended in Chapter IV[4], the service following the training should not exceed that required to perform existing necessary functions and to perfect skills. The period of time established for training duty should be the sum of the time necessary for the training itself plus the additional length of time required in order to bring the military forces in being up to a strength adequate to impede an enemy attack until reserve forces can be mobilized and effectively deployed for repelling the attack. This additional time can be profitably spent in a combination of advanced military training and related vocational training provided that the planning of the program is done on a broad basis rather than on a strictly military basis.

The universality of the training should not be destroyed by too great liberality in the granting of exemptions. Those cases where a man is exempted from training because of undue hardship either on the man or his family can be held to a minimum through assistance programs. Exemption for medical reasons should not be extended unless the defect

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[2] Supra, p. 40.

[3] Supra, p. 85.

[4] Supra, p. 83.

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renders the man incapable of performing even noncombatant duties; the mental standards should be similar. Too great a liberality in extending exemptions could easily destroy the democratic basis of the training.

Universal military reserve service would be organized on the basis of locality and age. Each age group in each locality, under the direction of older reserves who remain in the reserve force in accordance with point four, would be organized into self-contained units capable of military action within a minimum of time. The length of compulsory reserve service would be based on the number of units needed to meet the then current threats to the National security. At any time in the life of a reserve unit or upon a unit's completion of its period of required reserve service, selected men in the unit would be given an opportunity to transfer to a younger unit in a position of advanced authority and responsibility. These selected men could remain on reserve duty as long as they continued to merit promotion within specified periods.

This compulsory reserve service spread over a period of years would maintain health as well as skills so that the reservist would be physically able as well as technically competent to perform his duties in time of emergency.

Under this system the National Guard would have to be either completely federalized or else abolished as a part of the Federal military establishment. This is not to deny that the National Guard now performs necessary State functions. If it were completely federalized as an integral part of a Federal reserve system having compulsory reserve service as the keystone, the States would undoubtedly

organize State Guards to perform the State functions now taken care of by the National Guard. If it were to be abolished as a part of the Federal military establishment, the removing of Federal financial support coupled with not granting exemptions from military training and reserve service to members of the Guard would very rapidly reduce the size of the National Guard to that needed for purely State functions. In either alternative, the States would be left with organizations similar in functions and composition to the various State Guards organized during World War II.

If the manpower provided the Armed Forces through the operation of the first four points of this program is not sufficient to carry a war to a victorious conclusion, provision should be made for the drafting of women and older men, with proper consideration being given their vocational skills and family obligations. The majority of persons so drafted would be available only for noncombatant duty. Such a selective service system could be designed either to coerce workers to transfer from nonessential to essential industries or as a single segment of a National Service Program.

To evaluate this program, three major questions often used in debates on conscription[5] will be set forth and briefly answered. Will this program have a favorable effect on the efforts of the United States at avoiding wars? Yes, to the extent that strength compels respect in international relations. Assuming that diplomatic efforts at preventing wars may fail, will this program meet the military needs of the United States? Yes, since the size and length of training and

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[5]Wayne N. Thompson, "Permanent Compulsory Military Training: Analysis and Interpretation," Peacetime Military Training, edited by Bower Aly (Columbia, Mo.: Lucas Brothers, 1941), p. 38.

service are defined as that necessary to meet those military needs. Will the non-military effects be desirable? Restrictions upon exemptions combined with proper administration can keep the operation of the program on a thoroughly democratic basis, especially since the size of the professional forces is to be held to a minimum. In addition the holding of the number of career men in service and of training and reserve duty periods for conscripts to a variable minimum will make possible the lowest achievable cost to the Nation for adequate protection. This plan would make possible the advance provision in peacetime for the wartime manpower requirements of industry since the effect on each person of full military mobilization would be known and could be taken into consideration in industrial plans.

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

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